Chapter 8
Confusion over Pakistan
AS mentioned earlier, where Gandhiji went on a fast in the jail and
the British Government looked determined on ignoring it, some of the
members of the Viceroy’s Council resigned their seats. They were all
non-Muslims. The Viceroy then turned to the Muslims, expecting that
they would not adopt the same attitude of embittered defence.
He was right. One person taken into the Council was Mr. Wazirul Haq
who was given the portfolio of food. The Viceroy assured the
Secretary of State that the new nominee would behave differently and
not bring a bad name to the British. He writes on May 2, 1943:
“I saw him yesterday and gave him a talking too. I would runt the
Food Department myself, though not publicly, for the time being, and
the readily accepts that public responsibility will, of course, be
entirely with him, and he will have to defend the action of the
department in public and, of course, keep in touch with what is
going on inside. As regards Commerce, Industries and Civil Supplies
I begged him not to make the mistake of immersing himself in a great
deal of detail, that was properly to be handled by the secretaries,
not to overload himself or to slow down action by frequent
interference from his high level ….. He took this entire very well
and expressed himself ready to play.
It is worth noting that earlier ministers and now their substitutes
both were the Viceroy’s own nominees, and yet considering the
difference in their attitude towards the Viceroy’s dictates the
British seemed altogether right in placing their confidence in the
Muslims, whether as ministers or as officials. About that time,
Amery had also sent instructions that the non-Muslims who had given
in their resignations in connection with Gandhi’s fast should
immediately be allowed to go. In addition, others too should be
watched, and whoever seemed to harbour any sympathies for the
Congress should be released from employment.
Mr. Jinnah and Outlines of Pakistan
After the death of Sir Sikandar Hayat, Sir Kizar Hayat Tiwana became
the Chief Minister of Punjab. Hindus and Sikhs were also with him in
the Cabinet and as members of his Unionist Party. Since the idea of
Pakistan was still new and Muslim League was offering a variety of
explanations of it, the non-Muslim colleagues of the Punjab Chief
Minister pressed on him to request Mr. Jinnah for the authentic
version of it.
The Lahore resolution had mentioned Pakistan’s constituents as
“States” rather than “State” and then there was also the idea
floated that there would be a corridor linking east and West
Pakistan. Mr. Kizar Hayat approached the Viceroy and said that there
was confusion being caused by varying interpretations of “Pakistan”
and it was creating problem for him in Punjab. Besides a
clarification would also help in enabling the Muslims of Punjab to
make up their minds.
However a clear-cut statement on the issue did not suit the Viceroy
himself. His concern was not the interests of either Muslims or
non-Muslims. He simply wished to ensure that the two did not ever
come together. The more “Pakistan” remained vague the more it would
be a source of fear of the unknown in the opposite camp. So whatever
he might have said to Khizar Hayat, his letter to the Secretary for
India dated May 4, 1943, ran as follows.
From his (Mr. Jinnah’s) own point of view half the strength of his
position is that he has refused to define it (Pakistan). Thus I have
no doubt that the famous corridor by which he proposes to link
North-West Pakistan with North-East Pakistan, a corridor which would
presumably run via Delhi, Lucknow, Allahabad and Patna, cutting off
the area north of the corridor from the Hindu majorities in the
south it, would almost inevitably figure and he would be a fool if
he did not make all sorts of excessive demands in respect of tariff,
defence, the use of ports and sites.
The British were thus pleased with the situation. The more excessive
the demands the more remote would be he chances of any
reconciliation between the parties. But it is a also true that until
that time Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League themselves were not
wholly clear about the shape Pakistan should take. Take this issue
of “Corridor”/ it is hard to imagine that a swath could be run right
across India, from Calcutta to Lahore, and could be designated as
Muslim. On what basis? And then how would this length of 1,500 miles
be policed and safeguarded on both sides? How much army would it
need? A host of questions arise in the mind. Obviously, they arose
in the British mind also. Amery wrote on May 6, 1943: “The practical
case indeed against Pakistan seems to me over whelming.” And yet the
British were playing along and it is not difficult to see why.
When Gandhi’s first letter to the British government, that power be
transferred to Mr. Jinnah, produced no result and the reply to it
came not from the British but from Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Liaquat Ali
rejecting the suggestion of a national government. Gandhi then wrote
a letter direct to Mr. Jinnah from the Jail. But the letter was
intercepted by the British and it elicited instruction from Mr.
Winston Churchill himself in the middle of a tour of the U.S.
According to the minutest date April 24, 1943: “Winston telegraphed
from America urging that there should be no communiqué and the
letter simply suppressed.”
There was consternation in London. Mr. Jinnah had earned a bad name
by refusing Gandhij’s offer to head a national government. Now if
Gandhiji’s letter reached him some avenue of reconciliation might
emerge. Within India, however, the Viceroy’s view was that the
letter should not have been suppressed. Mr. Jinnah had been brought
to a stage from where it was difficult for him to climb down. On the
other hand, the Congress had done its own utmost – it had offered
Mr. Jinnah the rule over entire India. Thus the Viceroy was of the
view that there was no room left for any meeting of the minds. That
being so, why should the government get involved by intercepting
their communication, especially since Britain was trying to prove to
the world that it was allowing the contending parties full
opportunity to reach an accord so that it could hand over power to
them?
Mr. Jinnah was angry that he was not given Gandhiji’s letter and
strongly protested to the government. According to the Viceroy
Khawaja Nazimuddin raised the issue at Delhi and declared that he
and others were with Mr. Jinnah on this and were even prepared to
resign. After all that, however, Mr. Jinnah issued surprising
statement which pleased the Viceroy immensely. The letter writes on
June 1, 1943:
Meanwhile, the fact that Jinnah has wholly associated himself in his
public statement on Gandhi’s letter with the principle that there
can be no communication with Gandhi so long as the Mahatma does not
call off the policy of last August is a very valuable advance.
Gandhi’s call of August was that Britain should quite India. Gandhi
had latter written to Mr. Jinnah inviting him to talks. He had
pleaded that a world war was on; the country was in disarray;
Germany and Japan were harassing the rest of the world; it was apt
that the Indian leaders should also get together and ponder the
future. Gandhi had requested Mr. Jinnah for a meeting Mr. Jinnah
imposed condition that Gandhi should first call off his quite India
movement; that is, he should first announce relinquishment of the
demand for independent and an end to the struggle for it.
The question to ask is that struggle was against British imperialism
and for national self-determination. How was Muslim League or Mr.
Jinnah getting hurt by it? It might have been for the British to
make such condition. Did the Muslim leaders ask themselves how
adopted a policy basically in British interest was going to benefit
the Muslim cause? With his response Mr. Jinnah had also got the
British off the hook for suppressing Gandhiji’s letter to him, it
was like that story of the dead dog. A man requested a friend for
the loan of his dog so that it could help him guard his crop while
he was gathering the harvest. The friend said that his dog had died
several days ago. That would have been sufficient answer. But he
went further and added, “Even if it had not died I wouldn’t have
given it to you.” Mr. Jinnah told Mr. Gandhi that even if he had
received Mr. Gandhi’s letter he would not have responded positively
to it. Whatever else this did or did not do it absolved the British
embarrassment about the letter.
In addition to the pleasure Mr. Jinnah stand must have given to the
Viceroy, it had Mr. Amery dancing with joy. He wrote on June 2,
1943:
I confess I admire the skill with which Jinnah has taken advantage
of your deflation of Gandhi over this business of deflating him one
further, while at the same time adroitly saving his own face by
making it clear that the only letter which would have satisfied him,
and which he dared you not to forward, was one abandoning the whole
Congress policy (i.e., to the extent of making his condition
identical with yours.)
Coming across such events one repeatedly obliged to wonder whether
the Muslim League leaders also asked themselves what good such
attitudes were going to do the Muslim interests, or whether they
just felt happy and proud doing what suited the British.
Until that point the British had not decided to leave India. Sitting
in London the Secretary of State for India sometimes worried that
the Viceroy’s attitude towards Mr. Jinnah might carry things to a
stage that the latter might become a problem for the British. The
Viceroy’s frequently saying that his utmost effort was not to let
Muslim League fall a prey to internal dissension and conflicts also
sometimes used to create fear in the Whitehall that the party might
one day become so strong that it might prove even bigger challenge
that the Congress.
The Viceroy, Mr. Linlighgow, eventually decided to offer an analysis
of the political standing of the Muslim League and the Congress in
order to reassure Lord Amery. He reported on June 10, 1943:
Your comments on Jinnah’s attitude….I think he probably looks a
little more alarming form London than he does here. I don’t however,
think he wants a row with the government, though on the other hand
(like unfortunately all these leaders) he exists on being as rude to
government (and to his political opponents) as he thinks he dares. I
doubt if anyone takes it very seriously, and his threats do not
cause me any sleepless nights. As I have consistently felt and said
both to Zetland and you, Jinnah would be quite as bad a master as
Gandhi. But Jinnah is not in as strong a position as Gandhi’s and
Congress’ and he is never likely to be in the near future, since he
represents a minority that can effectively hold its own with our
assistance. Nor of course is his organisation as deep rooted as is
that of the Congress. I would expect him to be likely to continue to
be not merely non-constructive but positively destructive, and to
endeavour to play his hand so as to get the maximum in the way of
commitments favourable to his community and the maximum in the way
of hurdles to be taken by the Hindus, but without facing a showdown
with the Government.
That is how the Viceroy, and through him the British government,
evaluated Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim Leaguer. Mr. Jinnah himself was
aware of the position and its evaluation. That is why in the Lahore
session in which the Pakistan Resolution was adopted he told his
colleagues: “After the war (began)
I was treated on the same basis as Mr. Gandhi. I was wonder-struck
why all of a sudden I was promoted and given a place side by side
with Mr. Gandhi. He was aware that he had won no election nor had
his party acquired sufficient strength and yet he was placed on an
equal footing with party and a leader that had done both. Naturally,
the effort after that was to retain that position. Mr. Jinnah also
knew that the British had no one else to fight the Congress with and
was keen to take full advantages of the situation short of a direct
confrontation with the British.”
Mr. Amery was still not fully reassured about the Muslim League. In
his next letter Linligthgow advises him not be misled by newspaper
statements of the party and he writes on October 4, 1943:
But I believe as I have often said to you in these matters that the
Muslims (i.e., Mr. Jinnah) though they are bound to abuse us in the
interest of keeping their place in the public eye and so
safeguarding their reputation as good nationalists, have nothing to
gain from the disappearance of the British connection or from a
further weakening of that connection, and do not want any such
weakening
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