Chapter 6
Using the League to Beat the Congress
WHEN the Congress ministries resigned in the eight provinces that
they held power, governor's rule was imposed under Article 93 of the
Government of India Act. Mr. Jinnah advised the Viceroy that
non-official political advisers should be appointed in these
provinces. The purpose of the suggestion was that Muslim League
nominee should be included in the ministries of the provinces, where
the League had not been able to sufficiently establish itself. Even
the Viceroy found the suggestion excessive. He writes on July 10,
1940.
"I hope that Jinnah will not continue to press his extravagant
claim…If he does, I think myself that we may definitely have to
consider whether we should continue with the effort which I so far
made to keep the Muslim together, whether we should not let the
balance of the Muslim League as represented by Sikandar, Fazlul Haq
have their break with Jinnah. But I do not want to see such a break
if we can reasonably avoid it."
Later, on August 28, 1940, he pursues the theme:
I hope that Sikandar and Fazlul Haq will be able to bring pressure
on Jinnah to make him toe the line. If he does not, I shall go
without him."
The British were convinced that Muslim League didn't have a base,
that it was standing on their support; that If they pulled their
crutches it would fall on its face. They also felt assured that they
would never lack quislings from the Muslim ranks. If on the one hand
Sikandar Hayat Khan an Maulvi Fazlul Haq had position of their own
since they were elected heads of the ministries of Muslim majority
provinces, on the other, it was also true that if the word would
spread that the British were unhappy with Mr. Jinnah there was a
line-up of others who would offer their services. The Viceroy writes
of Sir Akbar Hydari on April 1940:
"You may be amused to hear that Hydari, during our conversation a
few days ago, coyly hinted to me that if there should be trouble
with Jinnah and the Muslim League there was at any rate a very
prominent Muslim who could steer the country through the troubled
water that may lie ahead."
The Viceroy says that he thanked him and said that it was best for
him to remain the representative of the Nizam's interests. He knew
that coquetry and affections of displeasure were parts of the
politicians' repertoire.
There was careful design in according Mr. Jinnah and Muslim League
special prominence. The idea was, if tomorrow there was an effort at
a rapprochement between the League and the Congress, the League
would have gone so far ahead in the split that it should be
impossible for it to retract its steps. For this reason the British
quietly listened to everything Mr. Jinnah had to say, even if they
regarded it as unjustified. They were confident that they themselves
held the key to the League's strength. As the Viceroy declared,
either Mr. Jinnah would have to pursue the British interests or he,
the Viceroy, would go ahead without him. But meanwhile:
"I still think it important to hold the Muslim League together if we
can do so and in those circumstances there is nothing for it but to
be patient with Jinnah, though one's patience is beginning
definitely to run out."
In this letter, dated September 5, 1940, the Viceroy hints at the
reason for the impatience. Mr. Jinnah had asked "that the Muslim
League should be taken into full and equal partnership with H.
M-Government in the ruling of this country and the authority shared
with them."
This meant that the country's Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis, the
Scheduled Caste would all be left cooling their heels while the
country would be run by the British and the Muslim League between
them, in equal partnership. Thus the League now laid claim to
representing all the Indians.
The Viceroy's own wish was to set up an advisory council with the
Congress left out. He had discussed the point with the Harijans and
Mahasabha leaders Dr. Ambedkar and Mr. Aney. But Mr. Jinnah had
refused any part in it since he could not be given total control.
Thus the scheme did not materialise and the Viceroy personally
apologised for it to the other two leaders. The Viceroy did not ask
Mr. Jinnah for the basis of his demanded whether he considered it
justified by the results of the 1937 election. But he understood its
implications. He writes on September 19, 1940:
"He (Mr. Jinnah) is subjected to very considerable criticism for
various sections of the community. He has against him the Prime
Ministers of the two majority Muslim provinces. The line he has been
taking is unsympathetic to large numbers of Muslims of position even
in Muslim minority provinces, such as Bihar and U.P."
But despite that the Viceroy insists:
"Indeed, I am sure Jinnah is the man to deal with on Muslim side."
Accordingly, the British had resolved to sort out every one of the
hurdles in keeping the Muslim League together. For instance, Punjab
had a Unionist ministry led by Sir Sikandar Hayat, and comprising
Hindus and Sikhs as well as Muslims. Here, the more Mr. Jinnah and
the Muslim League insisted on partition on India the more it created
problem for Sir Sikandar Hayat. It caused the non-Muslims to demand
that the British make a clear declaration of their policy on the
issue. The Viceroy himself was of the view that partition "would not
only be a mistake but it would be very near a breach of faith were
we to do anything of the sort" (March 1, 1941).
In the same letter the Viceroy relates that Sir Sikandar Hayat had
told him of his difference of opinion over the issue with the Muslim
League Working Committee and that he was therefore resigning from
that body. The Viceroy added that he did not himself say anything on
the point but asked the Punjab Governor, Sir Henry Craig to advise
Sir Sikandar against resigning.
"This is not the moment at which I want to see any split in the
Muslim League which I think is very important (tiresome as it's a
activities may be in some ways) to maintain as a solid political
entity….that is the more desirable since we are moving into the next
phase of Gandhi Satyagraha campaign and any fissure in the Muslim
ranks, more particularly over this vital question of Pakistan…..
Would be very great encouragement to the anti-war party and might
well make our position in dealing with the Satyagraha more
difficult."
The British wasn't particularly concerned about Muslim interests. He
repeatedly emphasised that Pakistan was not an acceptable or even a
feasible proposition. But his objective was to set up an opposition
against what he regarded as hi primary enemy, the Congress. That is
why he was concentrating all his attention on the Muslim League so
that if ever the Congress posed a challenge to him the League would
come down fully on the British side.
Sir Sikandar Hayat issued a statement to reassure his Unionist
colleagues, to which the British Secretary made a reference in his
letter of October 29, 1941. The statement proposed that the British
declare that if within a stated time all the communities of India
did not reach an agreement on the future constitution of India, the
British government would itself, reluctantly, give a constitution
according to its own judgement. The Viceroy made a significant note
in the margin of this proposal. It saysa "and make it perfectly
certain that the Muslims would refuse to play till (the situation
will have) brought us in."
The Viceroy couldn't have made his game more clear.
It will relevant to the Chief Minister of Sindh, Allah Bux Soomro.
It has been mentioned that a convention of nationalists Muslims was
held in New Delhi under Soomro's chairmanship. That had naturally
infuriated the Viceroy, since Soomro had nothing to do with Muslim
League and was the elected member of the provincial assembly. And by
the token of his Chief Ministership of Sindh he was also a member of
the Viceroy's Defence Council. Following the convention the
Viceroy's attitude towards him became not just bitter, but
insulting. So, once on the Viceroy's asking Soomro presented some
suggestions to the Defence Council regarding ways of forestalling or
resolving communal differences. He had also suggested that
Jawaharlal Nehru and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, then in prison, should
be released. The Viceroy writes about what followed in a letter of
October 11, 1941.
"When," he said, "am I likely to hear from you? Have you decided?" I
replied, "You will hear nothing. You are not of my advisers, but the
Prime Minister of Sindh…. I have not the least intention of telling
you how I propose to handle my business and I trust you understand
that" He said, "You are very frank" I said, "I am bound to be frank.
This is my business, my business, my responsibility."
It does seem odd that while on the one hand the Viceroy keeps
consulting with Muslim League leaders on all political,
constitutional and organisational issues, he does not, on the other,
grant the Chief Minister of a province and member of his own Defence
Council even the right to ask his opinion on certain proposals. Look
at the arrogance in his tone. Obviously he wished to make it clear
to Mr. Soomro that outside the Muslim League and the approval of Mr.
Jinnah he was not prepared to accept the credentials of any Muslim,
be he the elected Chief Minister of a Muslim majority province or
member of the Defence Council.
There was also an effort to make Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League
known internationally. About that time the Chinese leader Chiang
Kaishek was visiting India at the British Government's invitation.
He expressed a width to meet Gandhiji and Jawaharlal Nehru. The
Viceroy writes that his problem was he was not at that time on
talking terms with those leaders. That could somehow be got round;
but his greater anxiety was yet another one. He writes on January
26, 1942:
"I know you would at once take the point of his seeing Jinnah as
well as the other two, and I shall have to coax him to receive the
head of the Muslim League whether he feels inclined or not."
Chiang Kaishek was concerned that the Indian problem should somehow
be resolved. He noticed that the Japanese were giving the British a
hard time. They had taken Singapore and Burma and were now knocking
at India's door. He was, therefore, pressing on the British, both
directly and through the United States that some quick solution must
be found to the Indian problem. The Americans noted that elected
ministries had been formed in eight of the provinces following
elections held by the British themselves, but that now those
ministries were not in power and the rule over the provinces had
been resumed by the British through their governors. The Americans
were arguing with the British that today's wars were not fought
without the support of the people.
The British themselves realised that whatever the situation in
Europe, here in Asia, they were suffering badly. It occurred to them
for the first time that they might well lose control of India. In
the light of these new realities they began to take a second look at
their policies here.
So far they were strongly backing India's unity and the principle of
federalism; the encouragement of Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League
was only meant to keep them at a distance from the Congress so that
the controls remained in their own hands. Even the Harijan leader,
Dr. Ambedkar, went along with this strategy, as the Viceroy reports
on November 19, 1940:
"He was perfectly content himself, he said, with that state of
things, and was in favour of the Pakistan idea quite frankly because
it meant that the British would have to stay in India."
But now that the British saw the danger of their having to leave
India, They began to withdraw their stress on the federal
principles. Instead, they turned more seriously to the idea of
partition which so far they had only been using as a policy to
harass the Congress. The proposal was now formally sent along with
Sir Stafford Cripps as a part of his brief when he came to India to
negotiate a solution for the country.
Consider the situation, it was 1942. The demand for Pakistan had not
yet gathered strength; the Muslim League had not started any
campaign to canvass for it. But there were the British weighting
their own interest and already seriously examining the Pakistan idea
from every angle. But for the Americans pressure, they would not
have agreed to enter into any talks with the Congress, when they
also had the excuse of a world war on hand.
Even so, they had their own ideas. Listen to what the viceroy says
about the Cripps mission and its proposals, on March 23, 1942:
"I now have considerable hope that whether the scheme succeeds or
fails, that is to say it is accepted or rejected, there may be,
looking to the propaganda value involved in face of American
opinion, a balance of credit to our side."
At the other end, the secretary for India, Amery, looks at it from
another angle. He writes on March 10, 1942:
"Consequently the only way out and incidentally a way of gaining a
little time was to send someone to discuss and negotiate."
Thus, sending out senior cabinet minister to negotiate a resolution
would, on the one hand, gain the British valuable time, and on the
other, convey to the United States that the British were serious in
finding an answer to the Indian situation. "After all", adds the
secretary of state, "once it is laid down that there must be
agreement and no coercion of important ministries then the only
conclusion is that things must wait indefinitely".
He further clarifies the British thinking in a letter of March 24,
1942:
"Jinnah, I shall have thought, will be content to realise that he
has now got his Pakistan in essence, whether as something
substantive, or as a bargaining point."
Naturally, if Mr. Jinnah was convinced that the British were agreed
on Pakistan, how could he be expected to try and resolve issues with
the congress? And if the British made it a condition that there had
to be such a resolution, and also that the ministries had to feel
satisfied, then it could only be the British who would win and
everyone else lose. Mr. Jinnah would not get his Pakistan. Congress
would lose the provinces they had won. And the British would, as in
the past, be left the undisputed master of the country.
In the same letter quoted above Amery reassures the Viceroy
Linlithgow that the proposal sent out Cripps were all design to suit
the British interests: He lists the proposals:
1. The Viceroy will have to remain not merely as constitutional
governor -General but as representative of broader Imperial aspect
of Government for a good long time to come.
2. Supposing the Pakistan does come off, there will possibly be two
Muslim areas, the whole of the states, Hindu British India (If that
does not divide itself) and finally at least one important primitive
hill tribe area.
So once India is thus split into various pieces and there is no
federal centre, it will be impossible for all these parts to
maintain their separate army, navy and air force, and thus they
would remain dependent on the British. "There will, therefore, have
to be someone in the absence of a central self - Governing Federal
scheme to take control of these matters".
The argument thus was, firstly, the proposals were such that they
were unlikely to be accepted. Then, unless there was an accord
between the Congress and the Muslim League there could be no
transfer of power. And, even if these impossible became possible,
the British interests would remain assured. The Viceroy however, had
to be mindful of one fact:
Whatever you do, or agree to, keep in mind the desirability of
retaining Delhi And a considerable area around it as an not let it
pass into of an eventually United India and not let it pass into the
hands of anyone of the 'Dominions' That may temporarily emerge out
of the first experiment in constitution making.
This was the real face of the Cripps mission- the real thinking and
the purpose behind it.
If the secretary of state advises the Viceroy to keep the center
firmly in his Hands since if there was any partition it would be
temporary and eventually the whole of India would again revert to
the British Empire, the Viceroy too has some words of assurance to
offer in return. He writes in April 14, 1942:
However, I was at pains, without delay and before Cripps left. To
sound Jinnah through Feroz khan Noon, who has been a most useful
intermediary, with the result which I have already reported to you
by telegram.
The results are obvious- that Britain had accepted the principle of
partition, but the Congress was unwilling.
It is a curious situation. The congress mounts the movement, offers
sacrifices to defy the government, fills all the jails, receives the
bullets, resigns the ministries it has been elected, and yet the
demands conceded are the Muslim League's, which has neither launched
any movement, nor offered any sacrifices, nor won any elections, nor
has yet emerged as a political force to be reckoned with!
Sir Stafford Cripps appears mean while to have gained the objectives
he had been dispatched for. The Viceroy reports this good news to
the secretary of state on July 6, 1942:
Jinnah's statements in the last few days have brought out
emphatically the continued reluctance of the Muslim League to see
any compromise reached except on their own terms.
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