Chapter 5
The Proposals for Pakistan
THE Viceroy repeatedly impressed on Muslim League leaders like Sir
Sikander Hayat and Maulvi Fazlul Haq that their insistence that
power should not be transferred to the Congress or that election
should not be held at the centre was a negative approach. It
presented the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India with the
problem that they could not convince their own parliament as to why
if the Congress had won election it should not assume power. The
viceroy urged the Muslim leaders to present some positive and
constructive solution rather than obstruct the democratic path or
ask that a minority be allowed the power of veto over constitutional
demands of the majority, which the civilized world would not accept.
The Viceroy writes to the Whitehall about Sir Sikandar Hayat's
reaction to the reasoning in the following words:
"He thoroughly understands the necessity and importance of getting
onto a constructive line and having a scheme of his own on which to
stand before attempting any propaganda in England ….. He would let
me know confidentially how matters went in the meeting of the Muslim
League Working Committee on 3rd February."
After the Working Committee meeting Sir Sikandar and Maulvi Fazlul
Haq both went to see the Viceroy and according to the later,
mentioned:
That I should be interested to learn that the Working Committee of
the Muslim League has now instructed a subcommittee to draft a
constructive programme. I said I was delighted to hear it and that I
should await its terms with the greatest interest.
Later Mr. Jinnah himself went to see the Viceroy, who reports:
"After the usual compliments he opened the proceedings by asking me,
what we to do were, assuming that "we meant Muslim League ….. At the
risk of wearing him I was bound to repeat that it was quite useless
to appeal for support in Great Britain for a party whose policy was
one of (being) sheer negative."
This was a strange meeting. The Viceroy kept talking about elected
ministers and power transfer while Mr. Jinnah insisted that the
Viceroy, like his predecessor Lord Willingdon, should just turn his
back on the Congress. The viceroy argued that the times have changed
since Willingdon; Congress now had ministries in eight provinces and
if it liked it could at any time recall them. But Mr. Jinnah
insisted that until the Viceroy breaks off with the Congress
completely the Muslim League would not trust him.
The British meanwhile had a particular interest in one ministry -
that in NWFP. The Viceroy told Mr. Jinnah in one meeting that if
they latter tried, the formation of an elected ministry in that
province could be prevented. Mr. Jinnah said he would consult his
colleagues and then came back on it. Later he told the Viceroy that
his colleagues thought that they were not in a position to form a
ministry themselves, but if the NWFP Governor, Sir George
Cunningham, helped them they could succeed. He urged the Viceroy to
impress on the Governor how important it was to give that halo and
enable a non-Congress ministry to be formed in his province. The
Viceroy writes:
"Mr. Jinnah added that he was most anxious, if possible to put this
through, as he was convinced that there could be no more salutary
(result) for Congress and no better advertisement of the real
position in India, whether before the country or throughout the
world, than that a non-Congress ministry should be established in
the NWFP. He was therefore most anxious to bring this matter to a
successful issue."
It was a fact that NWFP was the biggest hurdle in the way of the
shared objectives of the British and the Muslim League. The reason
was that of all the provinces, this had the largest proportion of
Muslim population. Also, NWFP was situated close to the border of
the Soviet Union. A ministry of Khudai Khidmatgars there did not
suit Britain's internal or external policy. For such a ministry
could not be used either in opposition to the Congress or in support
of British power within the country. Mr. Jinnah was also broadly
hinting in the same direction when he said that a non-Congress
ministry in the Frontier would make a good impression within the
country and abroad. The actual position was that not a single
candidate in the province had fought the election on a Muslim League
ticket, and so that Assembly had no Muslim Leaguer at all. But the
Viceroy was agreeable to making the effort. He records:
"I would communicate his (Mr. Jinnah's) views to the Governor and he
and his friends would in due course and by one means or other, be
put in possession of the Governor's views."
This makes one point clear, that the British and the Muslim League
at that time had common ground. Just as Mr. Jinnah was unreserved in
asking the question. "What are we to do now?" So the Viceroy was
candid in voicing his dilemma. Mr. Jinnah was quite aware that it
was in the Britisher's own interest that they strengthened the
support behind them. He even suggested to the Viceroy that he
dissolve Allah Sommor's ministry in Sindh. His complaint is reported
by Viceroy in the following words:
…."But the Chief Ministers had made speeches recently copies of
which he would send me, which made the position in Sindh impossible
if the Chief Minister remained in power. I said I would see the text
of the item."
Britain was trying hard to persuade all the Muslims that if they
wanted its help in any matter they would first joint the Muslim
League. On the basis of this effort he was able to reassure the
Secretary of State of India.
"All I can say is that if Congress is set on having a fight here,
they are going to have a fight not only with us but with the
Muslims."
The position of the Muslim League at the time was that of sand bags
with which the British had built a defence around themselves, so
that if there was any assault from the Congress the impact of it
would fall on the Muslim League, and if the Muslim League got
plastered in the process that was its bad luck. If the Muslims had
actually wished that the chain of British slavery should remain
tight round the entire country, they couldn't have done more to help
that objective.
Varying Justification of Pakistan
Since the British generally, and the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow in
particular, had made it plain to Muslim League leaders that the
parliamentarians at Westminster couldn't be convinced with negative
politics and that they should come up with constructive and concrete
proposals, everyone of any consequence started thinking on those
lines.
One of these persons was Chaurdhry Khaliquzzaman. The Viceroy wrote
to Whitehall that Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman had proposed to Lumley, the
Governor of Bombay, that India should be divided into three
dominions. It seems that Chaudhry Sahib wished to set up a dominion
of the princely states as well as of Hindus and Muslims.
Then there was the report to the Viceroy from Sir George Cunningham,
the NWFP Governor, Sardar Aurangzeb, returning from a meeting of the
Muslim League Central Committee, had reported to him on the thinking
there. According to Cunningham:
"The scheme which they were now contemplating would involve the
creation of six or seven Indian dominions. And that this novel
scheme now holds the field in preference to the original Pakistan
proposal."
Long before this, the Secretary of State for India Lord Zetland
recounts a meeting with Sir Feroz Khan Noon, in which the latter had
suggested that the north-west of India should, like Burma, be
separated from India and called 'Pakistan'. The Secretary of State
says in a letter of December 13, 1938:
"I told him that I saw almost insuperable difficulties in the way of
our acceptance of such a policy. And he said if that was so he would
not himself encourage it when he returned to India."
Among various other proposals one was the Cambridge student Chaudhri
Rehmat Ali's, and another of Sir Mohammad Iqbal's. Now let us see
what the Englishman's own scheme was.
For, the ultimate decision was in the British hand. As for the
Muslims, their position was well reflected in the attitude of Feroz
Khan Noon who, when told, around 1938, that the British wouldn't
agree to partition promptly retracted and said that he wouldn't ever
mention it again. So what is important is what was it that the
British had in mind, what they thought would fulfil their objective.
When they couldn't tie up with Sikandar Hayat Khan and the Muslim
League Working Committee, they rejected all the proposals offered by
the Muslims, and asked one of the Muslim members of the Viceroy's
Executive Council, Chaudhri Zafrullah, to draw up a plan for two
dominions. That plan was duly forwarded by the Viceroy to London.
Later, on March 12, 1940, the Viceroy wrote to the Secretary of
State saying that he had asked for certain clarifications of the
scheme. He had been told by Sir Zafrullah that he, Zafrullah, would
submit the details later but meanwhile it should never be disclosed
who had drawn up that plan, though the Viceroy could use it in
whatever way he liked. Writes the Viceroy:
"I may do what I like it, including sending a copy to you; thirdly,
the copies have been passed to Jinnah and I think to Hydari (Sir
Akbar Hydari, then Prime Minister of the Nizam of Hyderabad), and,
fourthly, while he, Zafrullah, cannot of course admit its
authorship, his document has been prepared for adoption by the
Muslim League with a view to be given the fullest publicity."
The Viceroy explains that although the scheme had been drawn up at
his instance, since Zafrullah was Qadiani, the Muslims' knowing that
it was his handiwork would make it suspect in their eyes from the
very start. Consider the dates. This letter was written on April 12,
1940. The plan had been sent earlier. A copy of it had also gone to
Mr. Jinnah, and also to Sir Hydari (for the financing of it).
Obviously it was much the same scheme that was adopted as the
Pakistan Resolution just at that time, on March 23, 1940.
Incidentally Sir Zafrullah's tenure on the Executive Council was
ending in March. He was given an extension for services rendered.
Two days after passage of the Pakistan Resolution, the Viceroy
writes on March 25, 1940:
"As Congress putting forward a preposterous claim (of being
representative of the majority) which they know is incapable of
acceptance he (Jinnah) equally will put forward just as extreme a
claim, of the impracticability of realising which he is probably
just as well aware, but the existence of which will (1) while
reaffirming the Muslim attitude of hostility to Congress claim, (2)
take away some at any rate of the damaging charges which has
hitherto been leveled against them (Muslim League) that they have no
constructive ideas of their own."
Thus the Viceroy had kept pressing the Muslims for a plan, but when
they couldn't come up with any of their own he set to sponsoring one
himself. How pleased the British must have been felling with
themselves, first encouraging Muslim League to stand up against the
Congress, then inducing a 'positive' and 'constructive' proposal
from behind the scene as a pressure tactic, taking the public stand
that it was impracticable.
So when the Muslim League adopted the Viceroy-sponsored Sir
Zafrullah plan, the British became better assured that they could
depend upon the League in the promotion of their policies and in its
facing up to the Congress. Now on, they only recognised Muslim
League as the representative of the country's Muslims.
About this time the nationalist Muslims held a big representative
convention in New Delhi, presided over by the Sindh Chief Minister
Allah Bux Soomro. The Secretary of State for India, Lord Zetland,
enquired about it from the Viceroy. The Viceroy wrote to him thus on
May 14, 1940;
"I attach no particular importance to the Delhi Conference of the
Muslims which took place a few days ago. It has been well organised
and the Congress press machine has written it up admirable….We both
are, of course, aware that there is no important Muslim element
outside the Muslim League…..Indeed I am sure that Jinnah remains the
man to deal with on Muslim side."
The Muslims struggling with the Congress against the slavery of the
British and for national independence were, according to these
views, of no account. The British didn't even consider those Muslims
who had organised themselves outside the Muslim League. More than a
thousand representative people gathered under the leadership of an
elected Chief Minister were dismissed by the Viceroy as of no
consequence, while he declares Mr. Jinnah as the only man for the
British to deal with.
The Khaaksars were even in worse position. The other non-League
Muslims were charged with not supporting British rule, but the
Khaaksars had actually offered help. As the viceroy wrote on May 24,
1940:
"Meanwhile the Khaaksars have formally renewed their offer to me of
50,000 men to help in the War (against the Germans)…. (But there is
the) formal statement by Jinnah that he accepts no responsibility
for Khaaksars or the present attitude of the Khaaksars in the Punjab
it would not be advisable for me to enter into any correspondence
with them or their leaders, and I propose accordingly to leave, the
telegram (offering help) unanswered."
Against the Congress the British had the excuse that since the
organisation was not supporting them in the war they were not
cooperating with it, but here were Khaaksars making specific offer
of 50,000 volunteers and the Viceroy doesn't even have the decency
to acknowledge their telegram - and just because they were not open
to Mr. Jinnah's counsels!
Lord Zatland completed his tenure. About this time, his last letter
is dated May 14, 1940. L. S. Amery is appointed the news Secretary
of State for India. His first letter is dated May 16, 1940. |
