Chapter 4
Muslim League Plays into British Hands
AS MENTIONED earlier, Britain was resolved that there should be no
election at the Centre. After the War had broken out and India too
had been declared party to it, she got a good excuse. She also
received encouragement in this from Muslim League leaders. Here is
what the Viceroy writes on October 7, 1939, about the advice he
received from Nawab Ismail, President of U.P. Muslim League.
"The Nawab suggested that it was essential that any declaration
should make it clear that a democratic system at the centre is not
acceptable to the Muslim community and went on to urge that the
Congress claim to speak for India and to control defence was
perfectly inadmissible."
This was strange logic. The Congress which had won election in eight
provinces could not speak for India: while the Muslim League, which
could not form a ministry even in a single province, had the right
of veto.
Another Muslim League Leader, Sir Abdullah Haroon, sent a telegram
to the Viceroy to similar effect. The latter reports:
"Sir Abdullah Haroon took the view that democratic development in
the West did not suit India….The Muslims had no differences with
Great Britain except over federation which should be dropped. They
wanted the British to stay and they (the British) were now growing
popular with Muslim community."
Thus Nawab Ismail objects to federation on the ground that it is not
acceptable to the Muslims, and Sir Abdullah Haroon argues that
democracy does not suit India, federation is an inconvenience, and
that the British should stay on. Between this and the Congress
attitude it is obvious what pleased the British more. Not only had
these Muslim leaders, even the Muslim League Working Committee,
under Mr. Jinnah's presidentship, had this to say:
"Muslim League…..(is) irrevocably opposed to any' federal objective'
which must necessarily result in a majority community rule under the
guise of democracy and parliamentary system of government. Such a
constitution is totally unsuited to the genius of the people of the
country which is composed of various nationalities and does not
constitute a national state."
(G. Allana, Pakistan Movement p. 218)"
Here Muslim League is not speaking only on behalf of the Muslims but
claims to reflect the attitude of the entire Indian nation. Its plea
is even more dangerous - that since the country comprises several
nationalities it cannot constitute a nation state. The Working
Committee goes on to say:
"The Committee further urges upon His Majesty's Government to give
an assurance that no declaration regarding the question of
constitutional advance for India should be made without the consent
and approval of neither the All India Muslim League nor any
constitution be framed and finally adopted by His Majesty's
Government and the British parliament without such consent and
approval."
(ibid, p. 219)
When the Viceroy announced that there would be not election at the
Centre, the Muslim League Working Committee expressed great relief
in the following words:
"The Working Committee appreciates the declaration of H.E. the
Viceroy which is in the interest of India and particularly the
Musalmans that the federal principle embodied in the Government of
India Act 1935 has been suspended. They wish that instead of its
being suspended it should be abandoned completely."
(Ibid, p. 217)
Thus the Muslim League was ahead even of the British. They later
said that they accepted the Indian's claim to self-rule but had to
postpone the election at the Centre because of the outbreak of War.
This implied that when the situation would be normalised, the War
would end, election would be held and the elected representative of
the people would assume power. But this displeases the Muslim
League. It was unhappy that the election had only been postponed
instead the Viceroy should have announced the scrapping of the whole
scheme.
Pushtoons have saying - that the footman is faster than the rider.
It was unfortunate that such demands were being made on behalf of
the Muslims who numbered some ten crore (100 Million) and had
majority in several provinces. Keen that power should not pass into
the hands of the Congress where it was in majority, the Muslim
leaders unfortunately disregarded the interests of the Muslim
themselves. They overlooked the fact the Muslims had a plurality in
places like Bengal, Punjab, Sindh and even Assam.
Even Mr. Jinnah said in his address at an annual session of the
Muslim League:
"We felt we could never accept the dangerous scheme of the Central
Federal Government embodied in the Government of India Act 1935. I
am sure that we have made no small contribution towards persuading
the British Government to abandon the scheme of Central Federal
Government."
(Ibid, p. 230).
Thus Mr. Jinnah was proud, even claimed it as a Muslim League
achievement that the British had agreed to drop the scheme. It may
be asked whose idea this really was, the Britisher's or the Muslim
League's? Who really benefited from it? Whose rule did it guarantee?
This is what is called cunning. The Englishman pulls the trigger to
safeguard his own interest but uses the Muslim League's shoulder to
place the gun on. What can be a greater tragedy for a nation that is
political organisation should take pride in the nation's slavery
that it should consider it a great achievement that it had stymied
the scheme for transfer of power and ensured that government
remained in the hands of foreign masters.
It now seemed that a direction had been established - of the British
and the Muslim League working together in mutual interest. If on the
one hand the Muslim League and volunteered to promote British
policies, on the other, the British set about doing their best to
bring all Muslims into the Muslim League fold. A series of meetings
took place between Mr. Jinnah and the Viceroy. About one such
meeting, the Viceroy writes on October 5, 1939:
"He thanked me with much graciousness for what I had done to assist
him in keeping his party together and expressed great gratitude for
this."
The party was Mr. Jinnah's but the responsibility for keeping it
together seemed to have been assumed by the Viceroy. Another point
touched on by the Viceroy in this letter is also interesting. He
says that Mr. Jinnah complained about the Congress ministries having
been very harsh on the Muslims. The Viceroy replied that his
investigations showed that was not correct, and that the Muslim
complaints a rose only from an inferiority complex. Mr. Jinnah
wasn't convinced. He cited the example of the Frontier Ministry
which, according to him, had decided that Hindi would be made a
compulsory subject in schools. He had to find some thin to back his
complaint, so he picked on this allegation which he thought would be
irrefutable. What had actually happened was that Pushto, considered
necessary for Pushtoon Children, had been declared compulsory. Mr.
Jinnah apparently mistook that for Hindi.
Now witness how Britain plays her game of obstructing Indian
independence and fulfilling her imperialist and colonialist
objectives.
The Viceroy writes as follows to the Secretary of State for India on
December 4, 1939:
"I am fully alive, as my letters to you about Jinnah's questions
will have shown, to the objection to allowing the Muslim minority to
turn itself into a majority with right of veto, and that does seem
to appear to be a position that we can accept."
This was in clarification of his policy with regard to the Muslim
League Working Committee's demand that the British Government give
an assurance that 'no declaration regarding the question of
constitutional advance for India should be made without the consent
and approval of the all-India Muslim League'.
The Viceroy understood that this meant converting the Muslim
minority into the national majority and investing it with the power
of veto. But since it was also a question of safeguarding the
British Crown, the civilised, democratic Britain disregards the
principles of basic human rights, democracy, and electoral
commitment, and brazenly declares that it is a position that we can
accept. His eyes are closed in the furtherance of his own interests
and use the Muslim League as stalking horse to pursue his own
objectives.
In his subsequent letters to Whitehall, the Viceroy hints that if
Britain isolates the Muslim majority provinces in the North-west
from the rest of India it would serve her purposes well. The
minister sitting in Britain has the international perspective in
mined. He urged the Viceroy in India not to forget that the Hindus
are only confined to India while the Muslims are spread from the
frontiers of China to the Middle East and as far as Turkey, and
there is always a danger that their minds may once again turn to
Jamal Afghani's concept of pan-Islamism. He warns that if the
Muslims one day join hands with the Soviets against the British
would create a very dangerous situation for Great Britain.
The Secretary of State for India understands that in the overall
perspective, Britain had been high-handed with Muslim she had seized
power from them in India, and recently she had crushed the Ottoman
Empire into pieces. So her fear of Muslims one day striking back
with Russian support was not without basis.
The Viceroy sent for report from his Central Intelligence on the
situation all over India. On the basis of that he wrote to the
Secretary of State for India on November 17, 1939 that he had
detailed discussions with all categories of Muslims - Muslim
Leaguers, Wahabis, Khaksar, Ahrars, and experts concerned with
Afghan and tribal affairs, and reached the conclusion that the
differences between the Hindus and Muslims reached a point that the
outcome could only be a division. "Thus, shortly, a nation of Muslim
India must be established." This even before the demand was made by
the Muslims, and more than seven years before Britain appeared to
the rest of the world to very reluctantly concede it.
As for the Muslim's obtaining Russian assistance in a common front
against the British, the Viceroy's reading was:
"Such aid is out of the question, as once Bolshevik aid is accepted,
Islamic principles will be submerged, and if an opportunity is given
to Russian influence to be felt south of the Oxus, all Muslim
nations will degenerate to the level of the Soviet Central Asiatic
State."
He further underscores the point by categorically ruling. "Muslims
will not ask favour from the anti-God Bolshevik Russia."
On the threat of Pan-Islamism too the Viceroy is fully reassured:
"In the Turkish treaties are seen the barring of Bolshevism from the
Islamic world, and a rapid development of the line-up of Muslim
nations against Soviet expansionist policy."
Thus the Viceroy explains the merit of his scheme by saying that
like the Turkish treaties it would ensure the creation of a solid
front of all Muslim powers against Russia, and would become an
Islamic halter round Russia's neck.
Britain's success was that they had created allies among the Muslims
who were ready to support the colonial power in both her internal
and international policies.
Within India, Britain had already been using Muslims to safeguard
her interest, to retain hold over the country and to oppose the
Congress moves. The process had been simplified with Muslim League
expanding its embrace. Now the colonial ruler only needed to keep
this organisation in his hand to ensure support of almost all
Muslims. Using Islam against the Russians at first presented a
problem: if the Russians were non-Muslims so were the British. The
Soviets couldn't be represented as a kafir menace since the British
themselves, whose subjects Muslims already were, were equally kafir.
The British resolved this dilemma by pointing out that the Russians
were anti-God were atheists. As we shall see later they used this
line to obstruct any communication between the Soviets and the
Muslims very adroitly.
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