G. Allana. Muslim League Historic Documents.

The British felt compelled to review the situation all over again and rally all available forces in opposition to the Congress. Looking around, they identified three such elements. The biggest and the most loyal were the more than six hundred rulers of the princely states. There had been no elections there, nor did they offer any scope for a democratic or national-minded rule. The second were the Scheduled Castes. Their rallying point could be that the Congress was a body of Brahmins and pedigreed Hindus, while Harijans, numbering four crore (40 Million) according to Churchill, were a nation apart. The third force was that of the Muslims. They too were body of some 10 crore (100 Million).

Jawaharlal Nehru had set up a separate Congress organisation for the princely states, called the States People Congress. The state rulers argued that if the British, who held effective power over the country, could not defeat the Congress. How could they have any chance of doing so? The British had also drained all their power, and no one was left among them who had a will of his own or enjoyed personal prestige. The English tried hard to prop them up against the Congress but failed. The Secretaries Of State for India, Amery, got so disgusted with them eventually that he was compelled to write the following on October 1, 1943:


“It has been real mistake of ours in the past not to encourage Indian princes to marry English wives for a succession of generation and so breed a more virile type of a native ruler.”

In other words, in Amery's view the contemporary generation of Rajas, Nawabs and princes desired to be eliminated. If they had been born of English mothers they would have been more manly, and would have been better able to serve British ends.

The Harijan problem had been resolved by Gandhiji, who went on a hunger strike to get them equality of status and rights. Until then the Harijan leader Dr. Ambedkar was playing into British hands, and the British were very happy. But with Gandhi's tact, the Hindus told Ambedkar that if he was really concerned about Harijan rights he should join hands with Gandhi, for their cause was common.

That placed Ambedkar in a corner. He had no escape; Gandhi broke his fast when Ambedkar joined with him in signing the Poona Pact. Thus this second potentially also slipped out of British hands.

"That only left the Muslims, and the British started working on them so as to set them up against the Congress. After Lord Wellingdon left, the Quaid-i-Azam returned to the country and the Viceroy invited him over for a meeting. The letter he wrote to the Secretary of State for India on September 9, 1937 made the following reference to Mr. Jinnah:"


“He took very strongly the view that we did not pay sufficient attention to the Muslims, that there was the real risk of the Muslims being driven into the arms of the Congress.”

He goes on to say that Jinnah was particularly suspicious of his meeting with Gandhi."

He suggested that the interview (with Gandhi) was largely responsible for the lifting of the ban on Abdul Ghaffar Khan's return to the Frontier Province and the fall of Abdul Qayyum's ministry.

The clear message was that even if a co-religionist Muslim was on the side of the Congress, Mr. Jinnah had no use for him and would like to get the British support against him. Interestingly, even Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum was not a Muslim Leaguer. In fact, until then Muslim League didn't exist in NWFP which is why there was not a single Muslim League member in the provincial assembly. But since the Sahibzada was a British loyalist, there was this unhappiness over the fall of his ministry. It should be remembered that ministry had fallen on a vote of no confidence. Mr. Jinnah should have had no objection to what had happened as a result of a democratic process.

Mr. Jinnah's meetings with the viceroy continued. After the next meeting, the Viceroy writes on August 19, 1938:


“He ended up with the suggestion that we should keep the Centre as it is now, that we would make friends with the Muslims by protecting them in the Congress provinces, and if we did that, the Muslims would protect us at the centre.”

It seemed that this arrangement suited both sides. The Englishman knew that if he held election at the Centre, the power in Delhi will also pass into Congress hands. His effort then was to somehow free himself of that obligation under the 1935 Act. Mr. Jinnah also was willing that these powers should remain in the British hands and not be transferred to the Indians.

On the issue of the princely states also, it appeared that the British and the Muslim League were of one mind. The Viceroy writes on January 29, 1939:

"I gathered further that a resolution was passed at Patna to the effect that the All-India Muslim League would no longer be able to stand aside if Congress intervention in the affairs of the states continued."

They meant that the League was opposed to the rights of people in the states. And of the 600 states, hardly ten belonged to the Muslims. Most notably of all, the Muslims of Kashmir had at that time risen up against their Hindu Maharaja demanding protection of their rights. The League seemed to have overlooked them also, and was opposing the Congress for the protection of the rights of the Hindu rulers.

The Viceroy writes of yet an other meeting with Mr. Jinnah on March 28, 1939:

"But he was satisfied now. He thought that the present system would not work, and that a mistake had been committed in going so far."

In other words, Mr. Jinnah was opposed to the constitutional reforms conceded, and thought that the people pressing for them were unaware of the circumstances of the country. Democracy couldn't work. Provincial polls had been an error.

As the saying goes, what the blind man wants: two eyes. So the British had their prayers answered. Here was a party opposed to democratic reforms and was prepared to support the British against those demanding it.

It is worth remembering that was the time when the British had reached all corners of the world, and proudly claimed that the sun never sets on the British Empire. That claim seemed true also. He ruled over crores (Over Million) of people. He brought up his children on their wealth, and created his armies with their youth. Just as his empire was global, so his strategies were governed by international factors.

Following the elections in India and the assumption of powers by Congress minister's in the provinces, however, the British were worried. Apart from other factors, in their own neighborhood in Europe, Hitler was devouring smaller states and expanding his control. In Italy, Mussolini too had emerged as a threat and was nibbling away on right and left. The British had tried all their tricks, but, as the Pashtoons say, when the chips are down, cunning is unavailing. Eventually, they formally declared war on the Germans on September 3, 1939. Now their own house was on fire. Who could fight the Germans? The British were only lucky in that the British Channel lay in between.

In declaring war against Germany, Britain did so on behalf of India also. Congress objected to this. How Britain could do this without their consulting India, it asked. The Congress could now, in the light of the preceding elections, claim that it and it alone truly represented the Indian nation. The British were first surprised at these sudden new claims to the right to speak on behalf of India. They next tried to argue. A fascist force, they said, has emerged. It is invading sovereign nations and making slaves of them. Wouldn't the Congress side with the powers that are resisting this menace and are fighting for the independence of these nations? The Congress replied. On principle we support the forces of peace and independence and oppose fascism in all forms. But as far as India is concerned its independence is already since long under seizure. If the British are sincerely and honestly against encroachments on the sovereignty of free nation and want us to support them on this, it is only logical that they should begin by applying this principle here and first end the encroachment on India's freedom.

The Congress made its demand even more specific. It said that it would participate in the War only if Britain first announced its War aims and include in them a clear statement that when the Allies will have own the war, India would also be granted its independence. The Congress emphasised that it did not wish to profit by Britain's predicament: It only wanted a solemn declaration of intent from it, which would be appropriate also because that way the war of the Allies would also become India's own war of independence and the Indians would be able to plunge in it wholeheartedly.

But, of course, Britain wasn't prepared for this. As Winston Churchill declared at the time, he had not become the country's Prime Minister "to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." The Congress retaliated by adopting the position that the War might be for the independence of European nations, it is certainly not for India's and so participating in it would be like strengthening the chains of India's slavery.

I was present at the All-India Congress Committee (A-ICC) session in which the Congress president Jawaharlal Nehru declared that if Britain announces that it will free India following the victory against Germany, India participation in the War will become wholly justified, for then, "We shall be fighting for the liberation of own land, otherwise, we shall be fighting to defend our chains." Who would be so foolish and blind as to go fight a war, render sacrifices, and do that only in order to remain a slave?

This decision of the Congress all but exhausted British patience. So far Britain was only unhappy that it had held provincial elections, which had led to its freedom becoming restricted. It was trying to wriggle out of the obligation of taking the next step and holding election for the central legislature, for that would mean that the Viceroy, the honourable representative of the Imperial Crown would, like provincial governors now, become bound by the wishes of the elected cabinet ministers. Worse still, now, when Britain was engaged in a life and death struggle, when menacing clouds hung over its people, at such a critical moment, the Congress had the effrontery to put conditions on lending it a helping hand. Britain knew very well that if it did not have India's men and resources to back it up, it would find it very difficult to sustain its vast empire. It could not accept a situation in which this would happen. So it felt it had no choice but to come out openly against the Congress and to find a way of brining it to heel.

This marked a sharp turn in British policy in India. The War had caused a sea-change in the political outlook here. So far a federal arrangement in India was the obvious, accepted assumption. Apart from tactical support to the Muslims so as to compel the Congress towards some kind of power-sharing with it, Britain had throughout been working towards that end. But now Congress had adopted a course which not only led to self-rule but also aimed to so weaken the British as to reduce them to a position of subservience. The polarisation was thus complete. It became matter of life-and-death both for the Congress and the British-indeed, in my view, for India and Britain as a whole.

On Congress directive the ministries in eight out of eleven provinces resigned in protest against Britain's not promising India independence after the War. Thus Britain was shamed before its own Allies and before the rest of the World. That was the last straw. British attitude completely changed after that.

As the War clouds thickened over Europe, Britain set about rallying itself. In India, its eyes turned to Mr. Jinnah, but the position of Muslim League, of which he was the leader, was till uncertain. The party couldn't form a ministry in a single province. NWFP had a Congress ministry. In Sindh Allah Baksh Soomro presided over a coalition which too was opposed to the League. With the Punjab Chief Minister Sir Sikander Hayat and the Bengal Chief Minister Maulvi Fazlul Haq, the Viceroy had maintained direct links, and consulted them from time to time on political matters.

The War added to the importance of the Punjab, and Sir Sikander could even tender such advice to the Viceroy as to say about Mr. Jinnah, "Nothing should be done to inflate him," on the ground, among others, that Bengal and Punjab were already supporting the British and they don't approve of Jinnah. The Viceroy sums up the situation, and reveals his own attitude, in his note of August 31, 1939, as follows:

"Sikander's admirable statement on Saturday last seems fairly effectively to have spiked the guns of Jinnah and Muslim League. It seems to be pretty clear that relations between the Muslim League and the Punjab, Bengal and other important Muslim centers are becoming definitely rather strained and that the chances of a break way are considerable."

The Viceroy was unhappy with Mr. Jinnah. That was why apparently these other Muslim leaders were keeping their distance from him. The Viceroy goes to write:

"I do not propose to make any move to him until there is an outbreak of war or some other development necessitating immediate contact with all party leaders.

When five days later, on September 5, 1939, war does break out, the Viceroy writes to the Secretary of State of India:

"I felt it wiser to be patient with Jinnah and endeavour to lead him into the direction which we desire. And indeed if I can give any help to these Muslim Leaders to get them more together than they are at the moment I shall do so."

Only give days ago the Viceroy was happy that Sir Sikander Hayat was thumping his nose at Mr. Jinnah and that not only Punjab and Bengal but other centers of Muslims were also estranged from him and looked likely to the cutting loose from the Muslim League. But today, with War declared, he takes a some result and promises to exert himself to bring these Muslim leaders close together - just so that they could act in unison in support of the British.

Now it remains to be seen how this clever player makes his moves on the chessboard to extract the maximum benefit for him.