Chapter 27
Legacy of Colonial Interests
In Pakistan’s first government Mr. Jinnah was the governor general,
Mr. Liaquat Ali khan the prime Minister, and the other prominent
Muslim leaguers, like Mr. Chundrigar and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar.
Were all named the ministers. A Harijan, Mr. Logindarnath Mandal was
also included as law minister.
Muslim League had declared that in the Islamic state of Pakistan, it
would be the holy Prophet’s Shariat and the law of the Holy Quran
that would prevail. But now when the Islamic state was formed,
people noticed that of all the portfolios. That of
Shariat-i-Mohammadi, had been assigned to a Harijan. This became an
embarrassment for the country’s mullahs and pirs; especially so for
a person like Pir of Manki Sharif who had preserved a letter from
the Quaid-i-Azam promising Shariat and Islamic order in Pakistan.
Handing over the country’s top judicial post to a non-Muslim, making
him the Qazi-ul-qazzat of an Islamic state, did seem like a mockery
of the earlier resolves. Who could give a satisfactory explanation
of that?
There was however another aspect of this which has been mentioned
earlier. We discussed at some length how the British had adopted the
scheme to carve up the country in order to advance their imperialist
policies. They had planned an Islamic ideological for tress to
withstand the feared onslaught of Russia’s communist ideology. It
was designed to stretch from Turkey to China and to act like a
halter round the Russian neck. If this required dividing up India
and a bloodbath of the country’s Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs or if
needed fragmentation of the Islamic world, so be it. The British
were not really a foe of the Hindus or a friend of the Muslims, they
were promoting the Pakistan plan not of any good will for Muslims
but in answer to their own international objectives.
We also saw that at one time the British, in accordance with Lord
Wavell’s Breakdown Plan, had to decide that if they could not remain
in control of the entire subcontinent, they would let the Hindu
majority provinces go, but since the making of Pakistan was vital to
their interests, all the British civilian and military personnel
would shift bag and baggage to the Muslim-majority area. However
this plan was shot down by the Labour party government in London.
Wavell was soldier. His vision was limited. The politicians in
Britain knew that the times of military conquests had past, and that
no country could remain in military occupation of another for a long
period. They had considered the issues deeply and from all angles.
Following the partition plan, the British could see that both the
new-born entities had emerged weakened. India had remained compact
but strategically its borders had become less defensible. On the
north-west frontier the mountain barriers extending from Khyber to
Bolan and further up to Sinkiang on the Chinese border had passed
out of its hands. Similarly on the Eastern flank, Assam had become
more vulnerable since the river routes, railways, roads & airfields
had partially gone to east Pakistan, So had the three important
ports of Chilean, Khulna and Chittagong, which also meant the loss
of the heretofore exclusive control over the Bay of Bengal. Apart
from these geographical defences, India was also deprived of the
source of major military strength- the one which the British
referred to as P.M., short for Punjabi Mussalman. According to the
British the P.M. had been most useful in spreading and consolidating
the British power. There was hardly a corner in the vastness of the
British Empire where this Punjabi Mussalman had not shed his blood
for the sake of Britain’s colonial and imperialist’s interests.
Economically too, India faced a host of new problems. If the
factories were left on one side, their raw material was now on the
other. Similarly, the manufactures and their principal markets were
now divided by a barrier.
In short, the British had succeeded in lea ding the country to such
defence and economic dependence that, along with the rampant
poverty, it would for a long time kept it tied the interests of the
western powers.
Pakistan’s case was even more complicated and challenging. The
biggest problem was geographical – the country was divided into two
parts separated by one thousand miles of Indian territory_ a
territory where the consequences of the partition were still fresh,
where the blood shed in the communal riots was still warm. Pakistan
had no choice but to depend wholly on India for all communications
and flow of goods between its two wings. Besides this, there were
formidable economic problems. To tame and colonise the desert and
the barren and holly regions of west Pakistan and to reclaim the
inundated parts of East Pakistan, to make them productive, to set up
essential industries, and to take the country towards to developed
stage required not years but ages _pending which the country was
bound to remain in thrall to the western and the affluent government
of the world.
However, the most dangerous elements in the partition of India in my
view was the hatred and hostility created and which the communal
riots turned into a cancer. The worst destabilising factor were the
refugees who had to migrate from one country to the other in rags,
deprived of everything they had, including in many cases the honour
of their women-folk. After their experiences any state of normalcy
between the two countries, leave alone one of mutual amity and
co-operation, was unthinkable. It was thus natural that the two
countries should there after plunge into a mad race for arms.
Instead of spreading the benefits of independence and engaging in
the task of removing poverty from their lands they were compelled by
mutual hostility and suspicion to return to abject dependence on the
western powers.
Concerning India and the congress the British knew that they had
struggled hard and sacrificed a great deal for the sake of national
independence. The congress had emerged as the elected ruling
organisation of independent India and they did not expect that it
would want close relationship with them. Besides the Indian leaders
had for a long time been involved in the national movement. They had
acquired awareness and a breadth of vision that gave them a clear
understanding not only of regional politics but also of
international affairs. They knew well of British imperialism’s
designs and objectives. Britain was under no illusion that it could
use them for advancement of its interests.
About Pakistan, however, it felt better assured. It saw that the
government here was in the hands of an organisation, the Muslim
League, which had done nothing for the nations’ independence from
slavery to the British. All its opposition had been concentrated on
the congress, and that bad only made it dependent on the British and
obliged it to cooperate with them. The British also knew that in the
entire country there was one, and only one, organisation that had
taken part in the national crusade against them, the Khudai
Khimatgars of the Frontier province. But they had no fear from it,
since they also knew that because of organisation’s uncompromising
opposition both to the British bondage and the British communal
politics it was placed in the same relationship with the Muslim
league as it had been with the British, and hence the Muslim league
government would be bound to teat it exactly in the same way as the
British would want. Britain could also see that being a new country,
Pakistan would take a long time to find its feet and hence it would
remain dependent on Britain’s assistance in the future.
There was another helpful factor with regard to Pakistan. The rulers
here were almost all non-local. They had migrated from India and
were refugees themselves. Since their roots were not in the soil,
the springs of their strength were bound to lie in the Muslim League
itself, which in the past had failed to develop a political
following even in the Punjab. In the absence of a strong
organisation into the eager grasp of the bureaucracy. The situation
was thus altogether after the heart of the British. They thus felt
reassured about Pakistan’s further dependence on them.
They also quickly noticed that the Pakistan government was following
exactly the course they ha counted on. Almost all the key posts in
the new country went to their own men. When time to nominating
governors of the provinces, all except Sindh went to the British –
Sir Fredrick Bourme for Bengal, Sir Francis Mudie for Punjab, and
Sir George Cunningham for NWFP. Sindh got Sir Ghulam Hussain
Hidayatullah. That might be mentioned here. Since the capital of
Sindh as well as of the country as a whole was Karachi, and since
the governor house of the Province had to be taken over for the
governor-general of the country, the Sindh governor had to be
released.
Similarly the Chiefs of the three armed services were selected from
the British general Sir frank Masservy for the Army, Air vice
marshal Perry Keane for the Air Force and Rear Admiral Jefford for
the Navy.
In the central secretariat five secretaries were British, several
other senior positions both in the civil and military wings were
also held by the British. Sikandar Mirza in his autobiography wrote
of these men in glowing terms-how they worked day and night to get
the country on the rails. He was particularly rhapsodic about one of
them. Gen. Roses Makkay, who was responsible for the reorganisation
of the Pakistan Army. He mentioned two other British officers who
helped the country take possession of Gilgit and annex Skardu.
According to Sikandar Mirza these men organised an uprising among
the scouts there which paved the way for the annexation. “In the
most northern sector, things went well. We were able to take over
Gilgit Agency and Skardu, here a rising of the Gilgit Scouts was
organised by the two British officers with the scouts who were
pro-Pakistan.
In Pakistan’s first government Mr. Jinnah was the governor general,
Mr. Liaquat Ali khan the prime Minister, and the other prominent
Muslim leaguers, like Mr. Chundrigar and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar.
Were all named the ministers. A Harijan, Mr. Logindarnath Mandal was
also included as law minister.
Muslim League had declared that in the Islamic state of Pakistan, it
would be the holy Prophet’s Shariat and the law of the Holy Quran
that would prevail. But now when the Islamic state was formed,
people noticed that of all the portfolios. That of
Shariat-i-Mohammadi, had been assigned to a Harijan. This became an
embarrassment for the country’s mullahs and pirs; especially so for
a person like Pir of Manki Sharif who had preserved a letter from
the Quaid-i-Azam promising Shariat and Islamic order in Pakistan.
Handing over the country’s top judicial post to a non-Muslim, making
him the Qazi-ul-qazzat of an Islamic state, did seem like a mockery
of the earlier resolves. Who could give a satisfactory explanation
of that?
There was however another aspect of this which has been mentioned
earlier. We discussed at some length how the British had adopted the
scheme to carve up the country in order to advance their imperialist
policies. They had planned an Islamic ideological for tress to
withstand the feared onslaught of Russia’s communist ideology. It
was designed to stretch from Turkey to China and to act like a
halter round the Russian neck. If this required dividing up India
and a bloodbath of the country’s Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs or if
needed fragmentation of the Islamic world, so be it. The British
were not really a foe of the Hindus or a friend of the Muslims, they
were promoting the Pakistan plan not of any good will for Muslims
but in answer to their own international objectives.
We also saw that at one time the British, in accordance with Lord
Wavell’s Breakdown Plan, had to decide that if they could not remain
in control of the entire subcontinent, they would let the Hindu
majority provinces go, but since the making of Pakistan was vital to
their interests, all the British civilian and military personnel
would shift bag and baggage to the Muslim-majority area. However
this plan was shot down by the Labour party government in London.
Wavell was soldier. His vision was limited. The politicians in
Britain knew that the times of military conquests had past, and that
no country could remain in military occupation of another for a long
period. They had considered the issues deeply and from all angles.
Following the partition plan, the British could see that both the
new-born entities had emerged weakened. India had remained compact
but strategically its borders had become less defensible. On the
north-west frontier the mountain barriers extending from Khyber to
Bolan and further up to Sinkiang on the Chinese border had passed
out of its hands. Similarly on the Eastern flank, Assam had become
more vulnerable since the river routes, railways, roads & airfields
had partially gone to east Pakistan, So had the three important
ports of Chilean, Khulna and Chittagong, which also meant the loss
of the heretofore exclusive control over the Bay of Bengal. Apart
from these geographical defences, India was also deprived of the
source of major military strength- the one which the British
referred to as P.M., short for Punjabi Mussalman. According to the
British the P.M. had been most useful in spreading and consolidating
the British power. There was hardly a corner in the vastness of the
British Empire where this Punjabi Mussalman had not shed his blood
for the sake of Britain’s colonial and imperialist’s interests.
Economically too, India faced a host of new problems. If the
factories were left on one side, their raw material was now on the
other. Similarly, the manufactures and their principal markets were
now divided by a barrier.
In short, the British had succeeded in lea ding the country to such
defence and economic dependence that, along with the rampant
poverty, it would for a long time kept it tied the interests of the
western powers.
Pakistan’s case was even more complicated and challenging. The
biggest problem was geographical – the country was divided into two
parts separated by one thousand miles of Indian territory_ a
territory where the consequences of the partition were still fresh,
where the blood shed in the communal riots was still warm. Pakistan
had no choice but to depend wholly on India for all communications
and flow of goods between its two wings. Besides this, there were
formidable economic problems. To tame and colonise the desert and
the barren and holly regions of west Pakistan and to reclaim the
inundated parts of East Pakistan, to make them productive, to set up
essential industries, and to take the country towards to developed
stage required not years but ages _pending which the country was
bound to remain in thrall to the western and the affluent government
of the world.
However, the most dangerous elements in the partition of India in my
view was the hatred and hostility created and which the communal
riots turned into a cancer. The worst destabilising factor were the
refugees who had to migrate from one country to the other in rags,
deprived of everything they had, including in many cases the honour
of their women-folk. After their experiences any state of normalcy
between the two countries, leave alone one of mutual amity and
co-operation, was unthinkable. It was thus natural that the two
countries should there after plunge into a mad race for arms.
Instead of spreading the benefits of independence and engaging in
the task of removing poverty from their lands they were compelled by
mutual hostility and suspicion to return to abject dependence on the
western powers.
Concerning India and the congress the British knew that they had
struggled hard and sacrificed a great deal for the sake of national
independence. The congress had emerged as the elected ruling
organisation of independent India and they did not expect that it
would want close relationship with them. Besides the Indian leaders
had for a long time been involved in the national movement. They had
acquired awareness and a breadth of vision that gave them a clear
understanding not only of regional politics but also of
international affairs. They knew well of British imperialism’s
designs and objectives. Britain was under no illusion that it could
use them for advancement of its interests.
About Pakistan, however, it felt better assured. It saw that the
government here was in the hands of an organisation, the Muslim
League, which had done nothing for the nations’ independence from
slavery to the British. All its opposition had been concentrated on
the congress, and that bad only made it dependent on the British and
obliged it to cooperate with them. The British also knew that in the
entire country there was one, and only one, organisation that had
taken part in the national crusade against them, the Khudai
Khimatgars of the Frontier province. But they had no fear from it,
since they also knew that because of organisation’s uncompromising
opposition both to the British bondage and the British communal
politics it was placed in the same relationship with the Muslim
league as it had been with the British, and hence the Muslim league
government would be bound to teat it exactly in the same way as the
British would want. Britain could also see that being a new country,
Pakistan would take a long time to find its feet and hence it would
remain dependent on Britain’s assistance in the future.
There was another helpful factor with regard to Pakistan. The rulers
here were almost all non-local. They had migrated from India and
were refugees themselves. Since their roots were not in the soil,
the springs of their strength were bound to lie in the Muslim League
itself, which in the past had failed to develop a political
following even in the Punjab. In the absence of a strong
organisation into the eager grasp of the bureaucracy. The situation
was thus altogether after the heart of the British. They thus felt
reassured about Pakistan’s further dependence on them.
They also quickly noticed that the Pakistan government was following
exactly the course they ha counted on. Almost all the key posts in
the new country went to their own men. When time to nominating
governors of the provinces, all except Sindh went to the British –
Sir Fredrick Bourme for Bengal, Sir Francis Mudie for Punjab, and
Sir George Cunningham for NWFP. Sindh got Sir Ghulam Hussain
Hidayatullah. That might be mentioned here. Since the capital of
Sindh as well as of the country as a whole was Karachi, and since
the governor house of the Province had to be taken over for the
governor-general of the country, the Sindh governor had to be
released.
Similarly the Chiefs of the three armed services were selected from
the British general Sir frank Masservy for the Army, Air vice
marshal Perry Keane for the Air Force and Rear Admiral Jefford for
the Navy.
In the central secretariat five secretaries were British, several
other senior positions both in the civil and military wings were
also held by the British. Sikandar Mirza in his autobiography wrote
of these men in glowing terms-how they worked day and night to get
the country on the rails. He was particularly rhapsodic about one of
them. Gen. Roses Makkay, who was responsible for the reorganisation
of the Pakistan Army. He mentioned two other British officers who
helped the country take possession of Gilgit and annex Skardu.
According to Sikandar Mirza these men organised an uprising among
the scouts there which paved the way for the annexation. “In the
most northern sector, things went well. We were able to take over
Gilgit Agency and Skardu, here a rising of the Gilgit Scouts was
organised by the two British officers with the scouts who were
pro-Pakistan.
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