Chapter 21
The Choice of Governors General
A FEW things happened in Delhi about these times that were
unexpected for the British. One of these concerned India and the
other Pakistan.
In India the power was transferred to the nationalist movement
there, represented by the Congress. The latter comprised the
revolutionary leadership that had for years crusaded for the
country’s independence. They had been pitched against British
imperialism, and naturally they had bred deep bitterness among them,
especially after the Congress had launched the Quit-India movement
and the British response had gone to the extent, among other things,
of aerial bombardment. The British understood that these nationalist
leaders had gone through an ordeal of fire. They were bound to feel
even further embittered now that the colonial power was leaving
behind a trial of bloodshed and communal hostility. The British were
thus not surprised when the India constituent assembly rejected
dominion status and opted for making the country a republic. But the
surprise came when they heard that India would nevertheless want to
remain member of the British Commonwealth, with the British queen at
its head. They realised that the Congress leaders had, obviously
much against their personal impulses, taken that decision in the
higher interests of their country.
They had an even greater surprise in store when the Congress decided
that Lord Mountbatten would remain the country’s accredited governor
general over a transitional period. This surprised even outside
world. At a time when far-reaching decisions had to be taken and
when there was no dearth of front-rank, national leaders the
Congress decision to bestow all post-independence powers on a Briton
did seem out of the ordinary.
Decisions like this could only be taken by a wise and far-sighted
political leadership which was not influenced by personal feelings
of bitterness or sense of grandeur but was driven solely by
considerations of the country’s good.
According to Mountbatten’s secretary, Campbell Johnson, an assurance
had also come from Mr. Jinnah that the outgoing viceroy would be
invited to act as governor-general of Pakistan as well.
Provisions had been made in the act on Mr. Jinnah’s suggestion for
Mountbatten to be Governor General of both dominions and for
sometime it seems as if this might be acceptable, but at the last
moment Mr. Jinnah decided otherwise.
Campbell Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten.
Apparently, the British government was also informed of this
proposal. And on receiving the approval Mountbatten informed Mr.
Jinnah about it. Mr. Jinnah, however, started hedging, saying that
he had yet to consult his colleagues. Campbell Johnson says that Mr.
Jinnah was advised by his colleagues to go along with the original
decision since a lot of transitional issues had to be resolved, such
as the partition of the provinces, the division of assets, and it
would be a help to have Mountbatten’s mediatory authority for this
process.
According to Campbell Johnson, Mr. Jinnah did not take a decision
for several weeks, and then when he did, he announced that he would
himself be the Governor General of Pakistan: “He has at long last
come clean; Jinnah’s verdict goes in favour of Jinnah.”
Mountbatten says that when he larnt of this decision he tried to
explain to Mr. Jinnah that it would cause problems for him and his
new country. Mr. Jinnah’s reply however silenced him.
Jinnah solemnly assured me that he realised all the disadvantages of
giving up the common governor general… but he was unable to accept
any position other than the Governor-General of Pakistan on 15th
August…..
Hodson, the Great Divide.
Mountbatten argued that the governor general was merely a titular
head while if Mr. Jinnah wished to exercise control and power he
should consider the role of the Prime Minister.
His answer was significant. He said, ‘In my position it is I who
will give the advice and others who will act on them’.
Hodson, Op: Cil.
The viceroy made a final bid.
I asked him, ‘Do you realise what this will cost? He sadly said, ‘It
may cost me several crores (Several Million) of rupees in assets, to
which I replied some what acidly, ‘It may well cost you the whole of
your assets and the future of Pakistan’.
Hodson, Op. Cil,
Obviously, this decision of Mr. Jinnah’s struck as rather odd to the
‘British and to most others. For it was Pakistan that more needed a
non-Partisan man at the top for an equitable distribution between
the now divided parts of the country – and who could be more
appropriate than a responsible Britisher?
That now refused, it was natural that the British in their
disappointment should start bitterly criticising Mr. Jinnah.
Mountbatten was particularly annoyed. He had even conveyed it to his
government that he was by common consent going to be the joint
governor general. He now felt personally rebuffed and insulted.
What probably happened was that when Mountbatten proposed the idea
of a common Governor General Mr. Jinnah accepted it on the
assumption, held by most others as well, that India would refuse it:
how could the Congress nationalists reconcile themselves to the idea
of starting their independence presided over by a member of the
community against which they had so long been at war? Mr. Jinnah
might thus have calculated that by agreeing to the idea he would
have earned the goodwill of the British while, after Congress’
refusal, he would be free to withdraw the commitment without any
loss of face.
The Congress came out rather well from this episode. Comparing the
past of the two parties, it was seen that Congress had for years
been engaged in open conflict with the British, suffered jail terms,
exiles and violence of all kinds, which should naturally have bred
among its people hatred against the British, but now they had put
all that aside for the larger good of the country and demonstrated
rare vision and large-heartedness in making this gesture to the
British, their former foe. That certainly left and excellent
impression on the British and independent India started off under
very favourable conditions.
On the other hand, the Muslim League had neither much involved
itself in the independence struggle nor challenged the British rule.
It was generally known that but for the British there would have
been no Pakistan. It was the British who had greatly helped the
Muslim unite under the Muslim League flag. Similarly that had
provided Mr. Jinnah with the support to claim equality with the
Congress. At least in return for all this if not out of
consideration for the future of Pakistan, they could have made a
show of good will to the British. But they didn’t and their decision
did no good to the image of Pakistan and offered a sharp contrast
between considerations of personal grandeur on the one hand and of
national good on the other. It is possible that the British too felt
a sense of betrayal by the Muslim League decision, although there is
no question that what they had done for the party and Mr. Jinnah in
the past was not out of any consideration for them but in their own
colonial and imperialist interests.
The authors of ‘Freedom at Midnight’ have pointed to another aspect.
Mr. Jinnah had long been suffering from TB and the knowledge, long
concealed from him, had just been disclosed. The doctors had also
told him that he had a maximum of two or three years to live. It is
possible that too played a part in Mr. Jinnah’s not wanting to let
Mountbatten have supremacy even over a brief transitory period.
Besides, Mr. Jinnah was the kind of person who could not have
relished the idea of occupying a subsidiary position to
Mountbatten’s.
If the leaders were busy in the give-and-take of power in the
palaces of Delhi, the rest of the country was caught in the communal
fire. The Hindus and Sikhs were, doubtless, relatively prosperous.
Several of their community owned industries, business houses and
landed property. In the Frontier and particularly in Punjab,
communal riots led on to the looting of their properties and to
their being driven out of their houses their wealth left behind.
When these Sikhs did flee, they duplicated the same savagery back in
East Punjab and Delhi, and that caused a chain of arson, murder and
loot and even abduction of women. According to estimates, in Punjab
alone 30,000 to 40,000 women were abducted. This was Britain’s
parting gift to the people of this subcontinent – the same people
who for two hundred years had starved their own children to keep the
British children well-fed, had sacrificed their sons for the
protection and greater glory of the British empire, had not
hesitated even to attack the Holy Kaaba.
Yet today, as a result of Britain’s policy to divide and rule, the
nation had become so blind that the British enemy had become a
friend and the neighbours and friends of generations had turned into
objects for annihilation. The madness went to extraordinary lengths.
There was at least some method in wanting the Hindus and Sikhs to
flee and leave behind their properties. But what is to one make of
incidents like one Muslim Leaguer in Murree collecting his friends
and setting fire to 128 refugee houses? These houses had been
abandoned by their owners, they had become the undisputed property
of Pakistan, what was then the logic of setting fire to Pakistan
itself? But when does insanity have logic?
There were people looting for power, for property, for kingship or
minister ship, but for the common people the dream was turning into
dust. Their houses were being looted, their young ones killed, home
burnt, women raped, and the survivors made to abandon every thing
and flee for life. Even before the formal partition of Punjab, the
province had begun to be divided up. History books used to tell of
kings abdicating thrones and taking refuge elsewhere. But now we
were to witness the extraordinary phenomenon of the subjects being
obliged to flee the land of their ancestors and find sanctuary in
the neighbouring land. This was the first fruit of independence. The
surprise was, what was all this for? Wherefore this despoliation,
this bloodshed? Independence has been announced. Partition and the
creation of Pakistan had been agreed. To what end then this lunacy,
this transformation of lifelong ties of love into relations of hate?
A FEW things happened in Delhi about these times that were
unexpected for the British. One of these concerned India and the
other Pakistan.
In India the power was transferred to the nationalist movement
there, represented by the Congress. The latter comprised the
revolutionary leadership that had for years crusaded for the
country’s independence. They had been pitched against British
imperialism, and naturally they had bred deep bitterness among them,
especially after the Congress had launched the Quit-India movement
and the British response had gone to the extent, among other things,
of aerial bombardment. The British understood that these nationalist
leaders had gone through an ordeal of fire. They were bound to feel
even further embittered now that the colonial power was leaving
behind a trial of bloodshed and communal hostility. The British were
thus not surprised when the India constituent assembly rejected
dominion status and opted for making the country a republic. But the
surprise came when they heard that India would nevertheless want to
remain member of the British Commonwealth, with the British queen at
its head. They realised that the Congress leaders had, obviously
much against their personal impulses, taken that decision in the
higher interests of their country.
They had an even greater surprise in store when the Congress decided
that Lord Mountbatten would remain the country’s accredited governor
general over a transitional period. This surprised even outside
world. At a time when far-reaching decisions had to be taken and
when there was no dearth of front-rank, national leaders the
Congress decision to bestow all post-independence powers on a Briton
did seem out of the ordinary.
Decisions like this could only be taken by a wise and far-sighted
political leadership which was not influenced by personal feelings
of bitterness or sense of grandeur but was driven solely by
considerations of the country’s good.
According to Mountbatten’s secretary, Campbell Johnson, an assurance
had also come from Mr. Jinnah that the outgoing viceroy would be
invited to act as governor-general of Pakistan as well.
Provisions had been made in the act on Mr. Jinnah’s suggestion for
Mountbatten to be Governor General of both dominions and for
sometime it seems as if this might be acceptable, but at the last
moment Mr. Jinnah decided otherwise.
Campbell Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten.
Apparently, the British government was also informed of this
proposal. And on receiving the approval Mountbatten informed Mr.
Jinnah about it. Mr. Jinnah, however, started hedging, saying that
he had yet to consult his colleagues. Campbell Johnson says that Mr.
Jinnah was advised by his colleagues to go along with the original
decision since a lot of transitional issues had to be resolved, such
as the partition of the provinces, the division of assets, and it
would be a help to have Mountbatten’s mediatory authority for this
process.
According to Campbell Johnson, Mr. Jinnah did not take a decision
for several weeks, and then when he did, he announced that he would
himself be the Governor General of Pakistan: “He has at long last
come clean; Jinnah’s verdict goes in favour of Jinnah.”
Mountbatten says that when he larnt of this decision he tried to
explain to Mr. Jinnah that it would cause problems for him and his
new country. Mr. Jinnah’s reply however silenced him.
Jinnah solemnly assured me that he realised all the disadvantages of
giving up the common governor general… but he was unable to accept
any position other than the Governor-General of Pakistan on 15th
August…..
Hodson, the Great Divide.
Mountbatten argued that the governor general was merely a titular
head while if Mr. Jinnah wished to exercise control and power he
should consider the role of the Prime Minister.
His answer was significant. He said, ‘In my position it is I who
will give the advice and others who will act on them’.
Hodson, Op: Cil.
The viceroy made a final bid.
I asked him, ‘Do you realise what this will cost? He sadly said, ‘It
may cost me several crores (Several Million) of rupees in assets, to
which I replied some what acidly, ‘It may well cost you the whole of
your assets and the future of Pakistan’.
Hodson, Op. Cil,
Obviously, this decision of Mr. Jinnah’s struck as rather odd to the
‘British and to most others. For it was Pakistan that more needed a
non-Partisan man at the top for an equitable distribution between
the now divided parts of the country – and who could be more
appropriate than a responsible Britisher?
That now refused, it was natural that the British in their
disappointment should start bitterly criticising Mr. Jinnah.
Mountbatten was particularly annoyed. He had even conveyed it to his
government that he was by common consent going to be the joint
governor general. He now felt personally rebuffed and insulted.
What probably happened was that when Mountbatten proposed the idea
of a common Governor General Mr. Jinnah accepted it on the
assumption, held by most others as well, that India would refuse it:
how could the Congress nationalists reconcile themselves to the idea
of starting their independence presided over by a member of the
community against which they had so long been at war? Mr. Jinnah
might thus have calculated that by agreeing to the idea he would
have earned the goodwill of the British while, after Congress’
refusal, he would be free to withdraw the commitment without any
loss of face.
The Congress came out rather well from this episode. Comparing the
past of the two parties, it was seen that Congress had for years
been engaged in open conflict with the British, suffered jail terms,
exiles and violence of all kinds, which should naturally have bred
among its people hatred against the British, but now they had put
all that aside for the larger good of the country and demonstrated
rare vision and large-heartedness in making this gesture to the
British, their former foe. That certainly left and excellent
impression on the British and independent India started off under
very favourable conditions.
On the other hand, the Muslim League had neither much involved
itself in the independence struggle nor challenged the British rule.
It was generally known that but for the British there would have
been no Pakistan. It was the British who had greatly helped the
Muslim unite under the Muslim League flag. Similarly that had
provided Mr. Jinnah with the support to claim equality with the
Congress. At least in return for all this if not out of
consideration for the future of Pakistan, they could have made a
show of good will to the British. But they didn’t and their decision
did no good to the image of Pakistan and offered a sharp contrast
between considerations of personal grandeur on the one hand and of
national good on the other. It is possible that the British too felt
a sense of betrayal by the Muslim League decision, although there is
no question that what they had done for the party and Mr. Jinnah in
the past was not out of any consideration for them but in their own
colonial and imperialist interests.
The authors of ‘Freedom at Midnight’ have pointed to another aspect.
Mr. Jinnah had long been suffering from TB and the knowledge, long
concealed from him, had just been disclosed. The doctors had also
told him that he had a maximum of two or three years to live. It is
possible that too played a part in Mr. Jinnah’s not wanting to let
Mountbatten have supremacy even over a brief transitory period.
Besides, Mr. Jinnah was the kind of person who could not have
relished the idea of occupying a subsidiary position to
Mountbatten’s.
If the leaders were busy in the give-and-take of power in the
palaces of Delhi, the rest of the country was caught in the communal
fire. The Hindus and Sikhs were, doubtless, relatively prosperous.
Several of their community owned industries, business houses and
landed property. In the Frontier and particularly in Punjab,
communal riots led on to the looting of their properties and to
their being driven out of their houses their wealth left behind.
When these Sikhs did flee, they duplicated the same savagery back in
East Punjab and Delhi, and that caused a chain of arson, murder and
loot and even abduction of women. According to estimates, in Punjab
alone 30,000 to 40,000 women were abducted. This was Britain’s
parting gift to the people of this subcontinent – the same people
who for two hundred years had starved their own children to keep the
British children well-fed, had sacrificed their sons for the
protection and greater glory of the British empire, had not
hesitated even to attack the Holy Kaaba.
Yet today, as a result of Britain’s policy to divide and rule, the
nation had become so blind that the British enemy had become a
friend and the neighbours and friends of generations had turned into
objects for annihilation. The madness went to extraordinary lengths.
There was at least some method in wanting the Hindus and Sikhs to
flee and leave behind their properties. But what is to one make of
incidents like one Muslim Leaguer in Murree collecting his friends
and setting fire to 128 refugee houses? These houses had been
abandoned by their owners, they had become the undisputed property
of Pakistan, what was then the logic of setting fire to Pakistan
itself? But when does insanity have logic?
There were people looting for power, for property, for kingship or
minister ship, but for the common people the dream was turning into
dust. Their houses were being looted, their young ones killed, home
burnt, women raped, and the survivors made to abandon every thing
and flee for life. Even before the formal partition of Punjab, the
province had begun to be divided up. History books used to tell of
kings abdicating thrones and taking refuge elsewhere. But now we
were to witness the extraordinary phenomenon of the subjects being
obliged to flee the land of their ancestors and find sanctuary in
the neighbouring land. This was the first fruit of independence. The
surprise was, what was all this for? Wherefore this despoliation,
this bloodshed? Independence has been announced. Partition and the
creation of Pakistan had been agreed. To what end then this lunacy,
this transformation of lifelong ties of love into relations of hate?
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