Chapter 2
Divide and Rule
THE British thus became more and more convinced that they could best
achieve their ends through the instrumentality of Muslims. Their
agents kept making sure that no basis of a co-operation develops
between the two groups, and they both remain separately dependent on
them. Thus Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, writes
as follows on January 22, 1925:
"The more it is made obvious that these antagonisms are profound and
affect immense and irreconcill able sections of the population, the
more conspicuously is the fact illustrated that we and we alone, can
play the part of the composers."
The objective determined the rulers next needs were to find the ways
and means. After a great deal of manipulations and intrigues that
aspect was also sorted out. The good news from the Viceroy to
Whitehall is dated January 1, 1925:
"The bridge Gandhi had built to span the gulf between the Hindus and
Mohammadans has not only broken down, but I think it has, completely
disappeared."
The Englishman's worry was that the Muslims were scattered among
various organisations. They were all willing to accept the supremacy
of the British but none was ready to find accommodation with each
other. In the same letter the Viceroy while giving the tidings that
the conditions were now favourable and that the Muslims were
resolved to back the government to the hilt also complains:
There is no outstanding man to compose their differences and head
them.
In those days, apart from the fact that the Muslim strength was
scattered over several bodies, even the Muslim League was divided
into two groups. One was led by Sir Mohammad Shafi, the other by Mr.
Jinnah. The British were cheesed off with Mr. Jinnah because he
favoured joint electorate. The efforts were now directed to winning
him over to the other view. Thus, the Viceroy reports on May 20,
1929:
"I had a long talk with Jinnah a few days ago, which made it very
clear to my mind that he and all the Bombay people who are not
disposed to love Congress are disposed to swing in our direction if
we can give them help later."
Once convinced that Mr. Jinnah could lean on the government's side,
it became very easy for the British to start coaying unity within
the Muslim League ranks. As the Viceroy forecasts on March 21, 1929:
"The two wings of the Muslim League are to meet in Delhi at the end
of this month with a rapprochement between Sir Mohammad Shafi and
Jinnah. Jinnah may be expected to regain before long his former
commanding influence in the Muslim League."
Thus days before the meeting the Viceroy could predict an accord and
also say which side would clear the way for the other.
This done, the next task was organisation of the party and also
provision of funds. The Viceroy notes on November 26, 1929:
"I heard that suggestions are being put out that governments should
intervene in some way towards raising funds in order to organise
proper Muslims representation and of course we should like them to
have best advocacy they can find."
It seemed that the British had offered the responsibility of trying
to get all the groups together for the reorganisation, getting the
necessary funds, and worrying about a strong, well organised party.
They Viceroy had no other preoccupation. As he writes on February 2,
1931 of a meeting with Sir Fazl-i-Hussain.
"He developed the view that the only chance of some progress was
that a strong party should come into being which should devote its
self to fighting Congress"
Fighting Congress required organisation. It had to be one of
Muslims. The Englishman cast himself in the role of the godfather
who issued instructions from behind. It looked as if he were the
Muslim League president, and as if Lord Lrwin was actually referring
to his party men when he wrote on November 9, 1931:
I told him (Sir Mohammad Shafi) that I thought they would all have
to fight hard and that it was no good supposing that a few packed
meetings or newspaper articles (would) act as whole-time
missionaries and carry the flaming torch throughout the length and
breadth of India. They must be prepared to build up a great
organisation, which might focus all constructive efforts to fight
Congress ….. And they proposed to get to work vigorously and
comprehensively. This is encouraging and I only hope their good
resolutions do no fade away.
He added that the plan had been fully drawn up and that funds would
be contributed by the rulers of the princely states.
The Englishman's game was to get the Muslims to join together in a
sort of confrontation with the Congress and make it appear to the
rest of the world that the Indians were fighting amongst themselves,
so what could he do. Thus during the first Round Table Conference he
made full use of the communal differences and thereafter stepped up
his efforts to back up the Muslims against the Congress. When the
second Round Table Conference was called, the strategy was pursued
to further limits. Sir Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State for
India, writes with apparent satisfaction on October 2, 1931:
The delegates are much further off with each other than they were
last year, and I don't believe there is the least chance of a
communal settlement in the minorities committee."
The Harijans, or the depressed classes, were also similarly sought
to be involved in the castes issues and alienated from the congress
so as to further weaken the Hindus. It gives the British great joy
that like the princes, the Harijan leader Dr. Ambedkar also falls
into their hands. An excited Secretary of State of India writes on
December 28, 1932:
Ambedkar has behaved well at the (Round Table) Conference, and I am
most envious to strengthen his hands in every reasonable way.
But Gandhiji foiled this gambit by going on a hunger strike,
demanding a rightful place for the Harijans in the Hindu Society.
That places Ambedkar in a difficult situation. If he persisted in a
confrontation with the Hindus he would have to bear the
responsibility for Gandhiji's death, and if he adopted a
conciliatory approach he would lose the Britisher's support.
Eventually, Gandhiji fast produced result. Countrywide public
opinion forced
Ambedkar to join hands with Gandhiji if he really wished protection
for the Harijans rights. An agreement called the Poona Pact was
reached and was signed by Ambedkar himself.
This strategy having failed the Englishman were now left only with
the Muslims. Here, one difficulty was following the replacement of
Lord Irwin with Lord Wellington as Viceroy, Quaid-i-Azam had left
India and gone and settled in England. The rumour was the something
untoward had earlier happened between Mr. Wellington and Mr.
Jinnah.: (It was said that when Wellington was the Governor of
Bombay he once held a party to which Mr. & Mrs. Jinnah was invited.
Wellignton's wife was an extremely austere person. Mrs. Jinnah, a
Parsi lady, was apparently not sufficiently wrapped up to suit her
Victorian taste, and so she told her ADC that Mrs. Jinnah might be
feeling cold, and would he fetch her a shawl. Mr. Jinnah took this
as a slight and left the party with his wife. Since then his
relations with Wellington had remained soured). With Wellington
elevated from governorship of Bombay to Viceroy Ship of the whole
country, Mr. Jinnah didn't feel keen to come back.
Thus it happened that when the Viceroy was drawing up the list of
Muslim representatives for the third Round Table Conference Mr.
Jinnah's name was not there. Those on the list included H.H. the Aga
Khan, Hon. Chaudhri Zufrullah, Dr. Shafaat Ahmad Khan, Sir Abdul
Rahim, Sir Mohammad Yaqoob and Sir Mohammad Iqbal. The British were
however sure of their success. The seeds of communal discord they
had sown looked bound to bear fruit. The Viceroy was thus reassured
on October 31, 1932:
"The Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims are to meet on November 3 at
Allahabad to endeavour to arrive at an agreement which will do away
with the communal award. I am assured by those who know that no
agreement will ever be reached."
The mischief that had been done to rouse communal feelings seemed to
the British to guarantee that the elections that would be held under
the new reforms would firmly pre-empt any kind of joint front
developing between the two communities. The proof was also provided
at the third Round Table Conference where the differences were
sharper than at the second one. It was obvious that the Englishman
were very pleased with himself. He would take the leaders of various
communities to London, put them to fighting amongst themselves like
cocks and when no common ground would emerge would shrug his
shoulders for all the world to see as if to say - look, what pains I
am taking, how much money I am spending, but these Indians cannot
come to any agreement amongst themselves, so what course have I
left?
The British were clear in their mind from the beginning that if the
elections were held on the basis of separate electorates religious
sentiments would be bound to be roused. Among the Muslims, only
those parties would gain strength that would appeal to the voter on
the basis of religion. This would cause the nationalist Muslims to
contest against those standing in the name of Islam; and, secondly,
it would lead to the Congress being opposed in the assembly by
Muslim members elected on the basis of religion. As a result,
representation on the basis of communities rather than one deriving
from single nationhood would come to be accepted, and in this way
the Congress would never be able to induce national unity against
the British.
Although the Secretary of State for India kept writing to the
Viceroy, Lord Wellington, urging him against election the latter
remained adamant that the Congress had weakened, its civil
dis-obedience movement having been a total failure. Then latter went
to the extent of announcing the end of Gandhi as a political force.
From the reports and diaries of his own officials he was convinced
that the election campaign would so polarise the communities and
create such extreme feelings between them that the Congress would
stand no chance of winning: instead, a powerful party may emerge in
opposition to it. He had his moments of impatience, though, and
writes thus on September 9, 1934:
"But alas! Our backers are a flabby crowd without any courage while
the Congress, however stupid their actions, are not afraid of
fighting."
If there was no political party to stand up to the Congress
challenge there were at least individuals deserving of official
blessing. So, on September 24, 1934:
"I have written to Governors asking them to give a hint to the
ministers to help pro-government candidates and also asking them, if
opportunity offers, to see that good candidates are selected…….We
have to sit quite still up here and say nothing except in
private….On publicity we are doing the best we can….."
Lord Wellington's tenure ended in 1936. His place was taken by Lord
Linlithgow. In London Sir Samuel Hoare was replaced by Lord Zetland
as Secretary of State for India. Between them the two - but
especially the Viceroy - fanned the Hindu Muslim passions so
cleverly and with such finesse that no possibility remained of the
two sided coming together again. Like Lord Irwin, the new Viceroy
was also confident that under the system of separate electorate any
elections were bound to excite communal sentiments. The candidate
would appeal for votes on the basis of religion and the assembly
that would emerge would have few members of a purely nationalist or
Indian mind. The Hindu and Muslim members would in fact each seek
solution to national problems from the point of view of the interest
of their own communities and would try to ensure that their separate
electorates would have no reason to be dis-satisfied with them on
that basis. Thus, politics was to be dominated not by national but
only by communal concerns. |
