Chapter 19
Groundwork for Pakistan
WHEN Jawaharlal Nehru did come to NWFP without the governor’s go
ahead he received a reception from the government and its
functionaries. Erland Janson has quoted a number of officials and
malaks on what actually happened. In South Waziristan the Masud
Malak Gulab Khan himself told Erland that the assistant political
officer secretly guided him and others about what to do.
Malak Gulab Khan paid Rs.200 to snipe at Nehru’s plane when it would
land at Razmak. The assistant political officer, one Abdul Manan,
was particularly helpful and would encourage and guide them
secretly……
The situation is cleared and further explained by the dialogue this
man had with Faridullah Shah. Faridullah Shah, then was the A.P.O.
Khyber while Col. Khurshid was the political Agent. According to
Faridullah Shah’s statements:
At that time col. Khursheed was Political Agent of Khyber Agency.
Two or three days before Nehru’s arrival Khursheed sent for me and
told me Nehru was coming to Khyber. He said that if the tribal
should receive him in a docile way, all Mohammadans of this part of
the country will go under the suzerainty of the Hindus. As Muslim I
should do something but at the same time he warned me not to tell
him of the action I would take. Do you know why? He was a religious
man and if he was asked anything he could say he did not know. I
went straight to Jamrud. I contacted a certain Kukikhel Malak could
Swati Khan. The only question he asked was what would be the
reaction of the Political Agent. And I told him, don’t worry. I very
strongly told him that nobody was to be killed. They should resort
to very heavy sniping. On return from Jamrud I contacted Mullah
Sahib of Manki Sharif. He had then a lot of disciples among the
Shinwaris and Mollagories. So he also went on tour to Landikotal and
Mollagor areas.
Erland janson, op. Cit., p. 185-86.
In the event, however, I think the British bungled the game for the
tribal in Malakand. Nehru and his party were attacked there and
wounded, and that gave away the whole conspiracy.
The rest of the agencies are geopolitically different from Malakand.
They lie adjacent to the tribal areas on one side and to Afghanistan
borders on the other. Malakand has Mardan district on one flank and
Swat and Dir on the others. Obviously, the malaks in Malkand were
much more amenable to the wishes of the political agent than those
in the other agencies. Besides, the political agent in malakand at
the time, Sheikh Mehboob Ali, was involved in a bribery suit. During
the war days he was deputy commissioner in Kohat and was accused of
misappropriating a lot of government money allocated to the
construction of underground bunkers in Tal. Apart from enormous
amounts of cash, he was reported to have taken from here the entire
construction material-cement, bricks, iron bars etc. –for the
building of his own bungalow in his village in Sheikhan. With such a
background he was more than normally eager at that time to please
his masters.
Thus became attack on the Nehru party in Malakand. In any other
agency, the government could have shaken off responsibility, since
people there did have a measure of their own will. But in malakand
everyone knew that far from throwing brickbats, nobody could have
cast even a feather at Nehru without the political agent’s nod.
The object of sabotaging Nehru’s visit was to show that the Khudai
Khidmatgars were on the wane in NWFP and that the politics of the
Muslim League was League was now gaining popular acceptance among
the Pukhtoons.
The British thus showed their ignorance even in their cunning. They
did not realise that the khudai Khidmatgar movement belonged to the
settled areas of the province. Its leaders were not even permitted
into the tribal belt. Its assembly members came only from the
province. The election was held only in the districts, and the
tribal don’t have any vote at all. It was confused logic that the
demonstrations against Nehru’s visit in the tribal areas would show
that the khudai Khidmatgars had lost their popularity in the settled
parts.
In fact this was not so much a confusion of logic as an attempt at
political shrewdness. The British, their chief sectary De la farque,
knew that the province remained solidly behind the khudai
Khimatgars. They had no choice but to activate their quisling Malaks
and mercenary mullahs and pirs through their political agents to
stir up trouble in the name of Islam and then to use this to
discredit the popular ministry in the province. That would somehow
create a way for toppling the khudai Khimatgars and handing over the
control to the Muslim League- a prerequisite for the justification
of the division of the country.
There was once another charade. The Muslim League was asked to hold
a public meeting. People were brought in by the truck-load from
every corner of the province. The viceroy, Mountbatten, was also
invited to view the spectacle at the Cunningham Park in Peshawar.
Governor Olaf Caroe conveyed the impression to him that a public
meeting of this scale could only be organised by the Muslim League,
which was a clear proof that the people in the frontier were
switching over their loyalties in masse from the khudai khidmatgars
to the Muslim League. The viceroy was also told that the Cunningham
park gathering was an extremely resolute mass of people. They were
about to set off for the cantonment and the governor house. No
police or armed force would be able to bring them to the heel. But
just a word from Mountbatten would work as a charm. They would
promptly disperse.
Dominion status and Commonwealth
Muslim league remained adamant in all negotiations in Delhi. The
British efforts of years were bearing fruit. The view of both
Linlithgow, the Viceroy, and Amery, the Secretary of State for
India, had been that the wider the divide created between Hindus and
Muslims the Greater would be the opportunity for the British to play
the mediator’s role in a final settlement. It seemed that that time
had now arrived.
The British insistence on the inclusion of Muslim League in the
interim government at any price had led many people in India to
become convinced that Britain stood firmly on the side of the Muslim
League; that it had decided on the partition of India. As the days
passed the communal bitterness, hatred and hostility kept mounting.
Riots had spread throughout the country.
When the Muslim League joined the interim government it obtained the
department of finance, for it self in the distribution of the
portfolios. There were two clever Muslims in that department at that
time, Malik Ghulam Mohammad and Chaudhri Mohammad Ali. They knew
that the non-Muslim owned much of the country’s commercial and
industrial wealth. When they prepared the first budget for Liaquat
Ali Khan they proposed heavy taxes whose burden naturally would fall
on just these moneyed classes. It was difficult for the Congress to
raise any objections since its political objective all along had
been to improve the lot of the poor masses. The result was that even
these capitalists and industrialists began to feel that it would be
best if the political dispute was resolved once for all, the Muslim
League given the Pakistan it was demanding, and the daily brickering
finally ended.
It was also begun to be said that if the Muslim League was prepared
for the division, of Bengal, with Calcutta and Bengal’s steel and
coal going to India and the Muslim League satisfied with the ponds
and the barren and saline lands to the east, then why was the
congress objecting? Similarly, if, in the west, the parceling of
Punjab was acceptable to the League, why not agree to Pakistan?
Thus. Even among the non-Muslim in India, public opinion began to
get converted to the idea of a partition of the country.
The time had come for the final move. After the decision on
partition the British concern was to find a way of keeping both the
countries in a dominion status and within the British Commonwealth.
There was no question of any objection to it from the Pakistan side.
In fact Mr. Jinnah had long ago offered that bait to Lord
Mountbatten while persuading the latter abut the virtues of
Pakistan. He had suggested to the latter that the new country would
remain within the commonwealth. At that time Mountbatten had made
light of the suggestion. He later noted that Mr. Jinnah was
surprised that he had not shown particular interest in the idea and
had merely remarked that when the time for it would pass it on to
HMG. Mr. Jinnah had himself thought he was making a grand gesture to
the British.
The British main concern was however about the other emerging
country, India. When the undivided constituent assembly had met it
had decided on republication rather than dominion status for future
India. However there was also the view that the Indian government
would be a successor to the British rule and so there had to be some
continuity with the past. This would also imply that the separation
of certain areas to form Pakistan would fall under the definition of
secession. There was another difficulty India had over six hundred
princely states. These had direct treaty relations with the British
Crown. So if the now government didn’t come in as a successor to the
British there were bound to be complications in this area also.
All considered, then India had to decide on staying in the
Commonwealth. That cleared the last hurdle for the British. It only
remained to make amendments in the rules so that apart from
dominions, a republic could also join the body.
Britain was thus satisfied. Its communal politics had reached its
logical conclusion. It had pursued a policy of divide and rule. Now
that there was no way for it to continue to rule, it could at least
divide and leave behind a trial of horrendous communal bloodshed
involving hundreds of thousands people, and an intensity so
pervasive and deep-running that it will leave its mark on
generations to come. How better could it show its split for the
nationalist and anti-imperialist forces that had caused its defeat?
WHEN Jawaharlal Nehru did come to NWFP without the governor’s go
ahead he received a reception from the government and its
functionaries. Erland Janson has quoted a number of officials and
malaks on what actually happened. In South Waziristan the Masud
Malak Gulab Khan himself told Erland that the assistant political
officer secretly guided him and others about what to do.
Malak Gulab Khan paid Rs.200 to snipe at Nehru’s plane when it would
land at Razmak. The assistant political officer, one Abdul Manan,
was particularly helpful and would encourage and guide them
secretly……
The situation is cleared and further explained by the dialogue this
man had with Faridullah Shah. Faridullah Shah, then was the A.P.O.
Khyber while Col. Khurshid was the political Agent. According to
Faridullah Shah’s statements:
At that time col. Khursheed was Political Agent of Khyber Agency.
Two or three days before Nehru’s arrival Khursheed sent for me and
told me Nehru was coming to Khyber. He said that if the tribal
should receive him in a docile way, all Mohammadans of this part of
the country will go under the suzerainty of the Hindus. As Muslim I
should do something but at the same time he warned me not to tell
him of the action I would take. Do you know why? He was a religious
man and if he was asked anything he could say he did not know. I
went straight to Jamrud. I contacted a certain Kukikhel Malak could
Swati Khan. The only question he asked was what would be the
reaction of the Political Agent. And I told him, don’t worry. I very
strongly told him that nobody was to be killed. They should resort
to very heavy sniping. On return from Jamrud I contacted Mullah
Sahib of Manki Sharif. He had then a lot of disciples among the
Shinwaris and Mollagories. So he also went on tour to Landikotal and
Mollagor areas.
Erland janson, op. Cit., p. 185-86.
In the event, however, I think the British bungled the game for the
tribal in Malakand. Nehru and his party were attacked there and
wounded, and that gave away the whole conspiracy.
The rest of the agencies are geopolitically different from Malakand.
They lie adjacent to the tribal areas on one side and to Afghanistan
borders on the other. Malakand has Mardan district on one flank and
Swat and Dir on the others. Obviously, the malaks in Malkand were
much more amenable to the wishes of the political agent than those
in the other agencies. Besides, the political agent in malakand at
the time, Sheikh Mehboob Ali, was involved in a bribery suit. During
the war days he was deputy commissioner in Kohat and was accused of
misappropriating a lot of government money allocated to the
construction of underground bunkers in Tal. Apart from enormous
amounts of cash, he was reported to have taken from here the entire
construction material-cement, bricks, iron bars etc. –for the
building of his own bungalow in his village in Sheikhan. With such a
background he was more than normally eager at that time to please
his masters.
Thus became attack on the Nehru party in Malakand. In any other
agency, the government could have shaken off responsibility, since
people there did have a measure of their own will. But in malakand
everyone knew that far from throwing brickbats, nobody could have
cast even a feather at Nehru without the political agent’s nod.
The object of sabotaging Nehru’s visit was to show that the Khudai
Khidmatgars were on the wane in NWFP and that the politics of the
Muslim League was League was now gaining popular acceptance among
the Pukhtoons.
The British thus showed their ignorance even in their cunning. They
did not realise that the khudai Khidmatgar movement belonged to the
settled areas of the province. Its leaders were not even permitted
into the tribal belt. Its assembly members came only from the
province. The election was held only in the districts, and the
tribal don’t have any vote at all. It was confused logic that the
demonstrations against Nehru’s visit in the tribal areas would show
that the khudai Khidmatgars had lost their popularity in the settled
parts.
In fact this was not so much a confusion of logic as an attempt at
political shrewdness. The British, their chief sectary De la farque,
knew that the province remained solidly behind the khudai
Khimatgars. They had no choice but to activate their quisling Malaks
and mercenary mullahs and pirs through their political agents to
stir up trouble in the name of Islam and then to use this to
discredit the popular ministry in the province. That would somehow
create a way for toppling the khudai Khimatgars and handing over the
control to the Muslim League- a prerequisite for the justification
of the division of the country.
There was once another charade. The Muslim League was asked to hold
a public meeting. People were brought in by the truck-load from
every corner of the province. The viceroy, Mountbatten, was also
invited to view the spectacle at the Cunningham Park in Peshawar.
Governor Olaf Caroe conveyed the impression to him that a public
meeting of this scale could only be organised by the Muslim League,
which was a clear proof that the people in the frontier were
switching over their loyalties in masse from the khudai khidmatgars
to the Muslim League. The viceroy was also told that the Cunningham
park gathering was an extremely resolute mass of people. They were
about to set off for the cantonment and the governor house. No
police or armed force would be able to bring them to the heel. But
just a word from Mountbatten would work as a charm. They would
promptly disperse.
Dominion status and Commonwealth
Muslim league remained adamant in all negotiations in Delhi. The
British efforts of years were bearing fruit. The view of both
Linlithgow, the Viceroy, and Amery, the Secretary of State for
India, had been that the wider the divide created between Hindus and
Muslims the Greater would be the opportunity for the British to play
the mediator’s role in a final settlement. It seemed that that time
had now arrived.
The British insistence on the inclusion of Muslim League in the
interim government at any price had led many people in India to
become convinced that Britain stood firmly on the side of the Muslim
League; that it had decided on the partition of India. As the days
passed the communal bitterness, hatred and hostility kept mounting.
Riots had spread throughout the country.
When the Muslim League joined the interim government it obtained the
department of finance, for it self in the distribution of the
portfolios. There were two clever Muslims in that department at that
time, Malik Ghulam Mohammad and Chaudhri Mohammad Ali. They knew
that the non-Muslim owned much of the country’s commercial and
industrial wealth. When they prepared the first budget for Liaquat
Ali Khan they proposed heavy taxes whose burden naturally would fall
on just these moneyed classes. It was difficult for the Congress to
raise any objections since its political objective all along had
been to improve the lot of the poor masses. The result was that even
these capitalists and industrialists began to feel that it would be
best if the political dispute was resolved once for all, the Muslim
League given the Pakistan it was demanding, and the daily brickering
finally ended.
It was also begun to be said that if the Muslim League was prepared
for the division, of Bengal, with Calcutta and Bengal’s steel and
coal going to India and the Muslim League satisfied with the ponds
and the barren and saline lands to the east, then why was the
congress objecting? Similarly, if, in the west, the parceling of
Punjab was acceptable to the League, why not agree to Pakistan?
Thus. Even among the non-Muslim in India, public opinion began to
get converted to the idea of a partition of the country.
The time had come for the final move. After the decision on
partition the British concern was to find a way of keeping both the
countries in a dominion status and within the British Commonwealth.
There was no question of any objection to it from the Pakistan side.
In fact Mr. Jinnah had long ago offered that bait to Lord
Mountbatten while persuading the latter abut the virtues of
Pakistan. He had suggested to the latter that the new country would
remain within the commonwealth. At that time Mountbatten had made
light of the suggestion. He later noted that Mr. Jinnah was
surprised that he had not shown particular interest in the idea and
had merely remarked that when the time for it would pass it on to
HMG. Mr. Jinnah had himself thought he was making a grand gesture to
the British.
The British main concern was however about the other emerging
country, India. When the undivided constituent assembly had met it
had decided on republication rather than dominion status for future
India. However there was also the view that the Indian government
would be a successor to the British rule and so there had to be some
continuity with the past. This would also imply that the separation
of certain areas to form Pakistan would fall under the definition of
secession. There was another difficulty India had over six hundred
princely states. These had direct treaty relations with the British
Crown. So if the now government didn’t come in as a successor to the
British there were bound to be complications in this area also.
All considered, then India had to decide on staying in the
Commonwealth. That cleared the last hurdle for the British. It only
remained to make amendments in the rules so that apart from
dominions, a republic could also join the body.
Britain was thus satisfied. Its communal politics had reached its
logical conclusion. It had pursued a policy of divide and rule. Now
that there was no way for it to continue to rule, it could at least
divide and leave behind a trial of horrendous communal bloodshed
involving hundreds of thousands people, and an intensity so
pervasive and deep-running that it will leave its mark on
generations to come. How better could it show its split for the
nationalist and anti-imperialist forces that had caused its defeat? |
