Chapter 17
Subduing Punjab and NWFP
FOLLOWING the Muslim League’s demands, while it was occupying seats
in the interim government, that the elected constituent assembly
should be dissolved and all steps taken in pursuance of the Cabinet
Mission Plan should be reversed, the Congress asked that the Viceroy
immediately call for the resignation of the Muslim League minister
or it would be compelled to review its own position.
The British government summoned the Viceroy to London for
consultation. The latter, busy pursuing his own designs, kept
ignoring the calls, until on February 4, 1947, a special envoy from
the British Prime Minister delivered him his marching orders. He was
to be replaced by Lord Louis Mountbatten. The appointment was also
accompanied by the historic announcement that the HMG had decided
that by June 1948 all power would be transferred to India and the
British government would divest itself of all responsibility.
As to whom would be the recipient of the power, there were two
alternatives, if the existing elected constituent assembly came to
be accepted by all parties, well and good. Then Britain could
transfer power to it. But if there was no agreement on one assembly
and one constitution then Britain would have to think whether the
transfer should take place to one government or to the various
existing provincial governments, or devise some other means
acceptable to and in the best interest of the people of India.
The Muslim League apparently had some foreknowledge of the British
thinking, which was why it sought to foreclose the first option by
refusing from the beginning to participate in the joint central
assembly. That seemed to be the first essential step to wards
Pakistan.
The alternative of handing over power to the provinces had been the
British hint to the League that where it wanted to set up Pakistan
it should try and assume political control there. In other words, if
it wanted Punjab and NWFP it had to contrive and replace the
Unionists and the Khudai Khidmatgars there.
The British announcement came on February 20, 1947. After that the
Muslim League and its friends started concentrating on those two
provinces. Its objective was to somehow set up its own governments
there. It had lost the elections in both the places, so the only way
it could now insinuate itself there was through some
unconstitutional, undemocratic means. Punjab was less of a problem
since any outbreak of communal riots would scare the Hindus and
Sikhs away. The problem was in the Frontier, where even if the
non-Muslims were some who dispensed with, the majority among the
Muslims would still remain with the Khudai Khidmatgars.
Wavell during his viceroy ship had been trying to convince his
government that the only course serving British interest lay in his
Breakdown Plan. Sir Olaf Caroe, now the governor of NWFP, was in
Wavell’s time the foreign Secretary in New Delhi. And the foreign
Secretary under the British rule in India had but one concern; he
had to keep his eye on the country’s north-west frontiers with
Afghanistan. For, the British always thought that the only danger to
them came from the direction of Russia. Their unwavering objective
was to keep Russia confined to that side of River Amu, within its
own geographical and ideological boundaries.
Since Russia had only just suffered heavily in they were with Nazi
Germany the only fear from it remained ideological. And since the
British were using Islam for their defence against the Soviet
revolution their problems as that the province and all its passes
that provided a link between India and USSR through Afghanistan were
not fully under British’s way. The Wavell Plan too could not have
been implemented until this Muslim majority province situated in the
most sensitive part of the country could not be subdued. Every
effort was made during the election, but the province remained
outside Britain’s control. Besides, the Khudai Khidmatgar movement
had created such political awakening in these parts that all the
titled proteges and stooges of the British had been made to flee the
political field, and the broad masses, the poor and the deprived
ones, had become politically more effective.
However it was important for the Muslim League to gain control of
this province. The elections and the communal riots having failed to
change the situation one the ground, another rather dangerous scheme
was devised, the details of which have been recorded by Sikander
Mirza in his autobiography.
Sikander Mirza had been transferred from NWFP and was at that time
joint secretary in the defended department in New Delhi. He writes
that he received a telephone call from Mr. Jinnah some time in
February 1947, who asked him to come and see him. The Quaid began by
asking him if he accepted the Quaid as the leader of the Muslim, and
whether he would do what he, the Quaid, asked him. Sikander Mirza
writes, he could only say yes. Recalling that meeting with the
Quaid, Mirza continues:-
He then went on to say that he was afraid he was not going to get
Pakistan unless some serious trouble was created, and the best place
to do this way NWFP Province with the tribes. In his view it was
important to demonstrate Muslim anger before the British handed the
country over to Congress. If Pakistan was not conceded by
negotiations we must fight…He wanted me to resign from service, go
into the tribal territory and start a jehad.
This is worth pondering. It was February 1947. Wavell had been
dismissed. The British government had announced that it would hand
over all powers to the Indian by June 1948; Wevall’s going had
caused legitimate concern for Mr. Jinnah. He didn’t know what would
happen next. Communal riots were going on. He thought of something
very dangerous, and that too for NWFP. He bluntly told Sikander
Mirza, in the latter’s words, that “according to his information I
could achieve this if I really tried.”
This shows how Mr. Jinnah has established contacts with government
officials, and also that how the employees of the British rulers
could arrange “jihad” for him. Sikander Mirza writes that he
reflected on the various aspects of the proposals. As he understood:
This could only take the form of raids on border villages… yet I
decided to fall in with Quaid-I-Azam’s plan… I have no desire to be
branded as a man who was found wanting when the time for action
came…With the liberal expenditure of money I would be able to cause
some trouble in Waziristan, Tirah, and Mohmand country. I gave my
estimate of money as one crore (10 Million)….
There had also to be some formal excuse for his suddenly leaving
Delhi.
Mr. Jinnah had already anticipated these requirements. He had the
cover and the money ready. The cover was an appointment with H.H.
the Khan of Kalat and the treasure was provided by H.H, the Nawab of
Bhopal.
Sikandar Mirza went to see the Nawab of Bhopal the same day, and was
immediately handed a sum of Rs. 20,000. According to him, Mr. Jinnah
had also given him the assurance that if anything untoward happened
to him, his family would be taken care of.
Mirza recalls that he immediately got to work. He sent for some of
his trusted men from Dera Ismail Khan, Peshawar and the tribal
areas. After long discussions a plan was drawn up. He was to collect
all the people he knew well and then initiate action in Waziristan,
Tirah and Mohmand. However, before he could proceed any further the
circumstances changed.
Early in May, the Quaid-i-Azam sent for me again and told me that as
Pakistan would be conceded, the Plan would be abandoned.
Mirza goes on to record his opinion about the Quaid. He says that he
was the kind of leader who made his own decisions and accepted no
counsels. He quoted the Quaid himself on this after Pakistan was
born and the Quaid was its governor general. He had made bold to
suggest to the Quaid:
That we must try to be considerate to the Muslim League as after all
they had brought in Pakistan. Jinnah immediately replied: “Who told
you that Muslim League brought in Pakistan? I brought in Pakistan –
with my Stenographer.
The whole episode thus shows how top-most employees of the British
government were ready to render assistance to the Muslim League; and
also that how having failed through constitutional and democratic
means Mr. Jinnah was prepared to initiate a jihad against India just
in order to bring down the Khudai Khidmatgar government in NWFP.
Thirdly, it is also obvious how the government functionaries had
maintained liasion with the tribal areas and their leaders, to the
extent that the latter were ready to wage a war on their own country
at these officials bidding. Also, how the princely states were
generous in giving assistance – in crores (in Million) of those
days!
Toppling the Unionist ministry of Khizar Hayat in Punjab was much
less difficult a proposition. If on one side Muslim league started a
civil disobedience movement against it, on the other communal fire
broke out. Arms and ammunition flowed inform the Frontier and the
tribal areas. Muslim Leaguers’ going to jail following the civil
disobedience was a joke in itself. The Punjab Muslim League
President Mian Iftikharuddin, for instance, used to get the choicest
food from home. It used to be like a feast. He was even permitted to
go and attend parties, and even to spend the nights at home!
In short, if on the one hand the communal riots removed the Hindu
and Sikh members of the assembly out of the way, on the other the
civil disobedience compelled Khizar Hayat to tender his cabinet’s
resignation on March 3, 1947. Since the Muslim League was in no
position to form the government itself the powers to rule were
seized by the British Governor himself under Section 93.
The Hindus and Sikh soon realised that the British were trying to
pave the ground for the Muslim League to come in the province. They
started protest demonstrations. That further inflamed passions, and
the communal loot, arson, killing and abduction of women soon
assumed horrendous proportions.
NWFP, remained the only province out of the Muslim League’s wings.
Here again there was communal rioting and thousands from the tribal
areas took place. The point sought to be made was, if the province
government was not capable of maintaining peace it should resign. If
on the other hand, it resorted to strong measure outcry could be
raised in the press and from the platform that it was perpetrating
tyranny on the Muslim population of the province.
The difference between the Punjab and the Frontier was that the
Unionists were a ministerial party, they did not have political
roots; but here in the Frontier those in control were Khudai
Khidmatgars who were a bold, disciplined organisation.
Muslim League tried all the tricks in its bag to dislodge the
latter. Top leaders from the rest of India were sent on tour to the
Frontier. Real and imaginary tales of Hindu-inspired riots were
spread–especially those of Bihar–in order to inflame Pushtoon
sentiment. There was no limit to the money poured in. And student
delegation came out from Punjab and Aligarh.
A military officer from Punjab who resigned from the service came
stalking the province and triggering disruptive activities. Until
now Khudai Khidmatgars were maintaining exemplary self-control,
carrying on their brave campaign against the British on the
principles of non-violence. But the Muslim League agitation now led
to bomb explosions and even to the killing of non-Muslims. There
were recorded confessions in this respect, cited by Erland Janson in
his book India, Pakistan or Pukhtoonistan.
For instance, the chief instructor of the Hangu Police School used
to supply bomb and give guidance for their use. Alam Khan admitted
to Janson that he was well paid for doing this by Pir of Manki
Sharif. All the government officials in the province were also
aiding the Muslim League in the agitation. The President of the
students federation told Janson that a Captain in the Police
Faizullah Khan, kept a close liaison with them, and whatever
decisions were taken about the agitation at official meetings were
promptly disclosed to them. During public demonstrations the police
took care that their lathis fell everywhere except on their persons.
The Muslim Leaguers sent to jail for civil disobedience and
violation of Section 144, were sentenced for three months, but they
were mostly free to roam the streets during the day and even spend
the nights at home. A friend borrowed my car for a night. Later it
transpired that a friend of his, a Khan from Mardan, used the cart
to go home for the night and return to the Jail the next morning.
About that time, the NWFP assembly had a session. Maj. Khurshid
Anwar arranged that a procession should be taken to the assembly
building and it should create such a racket that the session would
be disrupted. The procession included students and followers of Pir
of Manki. Khurshid Anwar asked the students to stay behind and let
the others be in front. The police indicated to them the limit
beyond which they should not proceed. But the students pushed the
Pir’s followers beyond the line where upon police opened fire, and
some got hit. Khurshid Anwar said, the job was done, all could now
disperse.
The mission is completed. He wanted to shed Muslim blood, now it has
been done – Erland Janson. P-169.
Miscreants like Khurshid Anwar kept themselves active throughout the
province, untouched by government agencies. Hindus and Sikhs were
harassed, robbed and even killed. The British were clearly following
a partisan policy. The British governor, Sir Olaf Carore, and his
subordinates were keen that somehow the ministry should be made to
collapse.
About Caroe, the Viceroy, Wavell, had himself written; “Caroe
himself has never yet reconciled to the idea of our leaving Inida”
(P.329). Caroe was still hoping for Wavell’s Breakdown Plan to come
through, and NWFP, with the tribal on one side and Afghanistan and
the Soviets on the other, was a crucial link in that plan. The
British here were concerned wholly about the interests of the throne
and the crown. They felt that Muslim League could be an instrument
in the promotion of those interests.
When the British saw that neither through communal riots nor through
the Muslim League’s campaign of civil disobedience could the
ministry of Dr. Khan Sahib be dislodged, they turned to yet another
game plan.
FOLLOWING the Muslim League’s demands, while it was occupying seats
in the interim government, that the elected constituent assembly
should be dissolved and all steps taken in pursuance of the Cabinet
Mission Plan should be reversed, the Congress asked that the Viceroy
immediately call for the resignation of the Muslim League minister
or it would be compelled to review its own position.
The British government summoned the Viceroy to London for
consultation. The latter, busy pursuing his own designs, kept
ignoring the calls, until on February 4, 1947, a special envoy from
the British Prime Minister delivered him his marching orders. He was
to be replaced by Lord Louis Mountbatten. The appointment was also
accompanied by the historic announcement that the HMG had decided
that by June 1948 all power would be transferred to India and the
British government would divest itself of all responsibility.
As to whom would be the recipient of the power, there were two
alternatives, if the existing elected constituent assembly came to
be accepted by all parties, well and good. Then Britain could
transfer power to it. But if there was no agreement on one assembly
and one constitution then Britain would have to think whether the
transfer should take place to one government or to the various
existing provincial governments, or devise some other means
acceptable to and in the best interest of the people of India.
The Muslim League apparently had some foreknowledge of the British
thinking, which was why it sought to foreclose the first option by
refusing from the beginning to participate in the joint central
assembly. That seemed to be the first essential step to wards
Pakistan.
The alternative of handing over power to the provinces had been the
British hint to the League that where it wanted to set up Pakistan
it should try and assume political control there. In other words, if
it wanted Punjab and NWFP it had to contrive and replace the
Unionists and the Khudai Khidmatgars there.
The British announcement came on February 20, 1947. After that the
Muslim League and its friends started concentrating on those two
provinces. Its objective was to somehow set up its own governments
there. It had lost the elections in both the places, so the only way
it could now insinuate itself there was through some
unconstitutional, undemocratic means. Punjab was less of a problem
since any outbreak of communal riots would scare the Hindus and
Sikhs away. The problem was in the Frontier, where even if the
non-Muslims were some who dispensed with, the majority among the
Muslims would still remain with the Khudai Khidmatgars.
Wavell during his viceroy ship had been trying to convince his
government that the only course serving British interest lay in his
Breakdown Plan. Sir Olaf Caroe, now the governor of NWFP, was in
Wavell’s time the foreign Secretary in New Delhi. And the foreign
Secretary under the British rule in India had but one concern; he
had to keep his eye on the country’s north-west frontiers with
Afghanistan. For, the British always thought that the only danger to
them came from the direction of Russia. Their unwavering objective
was to keep Russia confined to that side of River Amu, within its
own geographical and ideological boundaries.
Since Russia had only just suffered heavily in they were with Nazi
Germany the only fear from it remained ideological. And since the
British were using Islam for their defence against the Soviet
revolution their problems as that the province and all its passes
that provided a link between India and USSR through Afghanistan were
not fully under British’s way. The Wavell Plan too could not have
been implemented until this Muslim majority province situated in the
most sensitive part of the country could not be subdued. Every
effort was made during the election, but the province remained
outside Britain’s control. Besides, the Khudai Khidmatgar movement
had created such political awakening in these parts that all the
titled proteges and stooges of the British had been made to flee the
political field, and the broad masses, the poor and the deprived
ones, had become politically more effective.
However it was important for the Muslim League to gain control of
this province. The elections and the communal riots having failed to
change the situation one the ground, another rather dangerous scheme
was devised, the details of which have been recorded by Sikander
Mirza in his autobiography.
Sikander Mirza had been transferred from NWFP and was at that time
joint secretary in the defended department in New Delhi. He writes
that he received a telephone call from Mr. Jinnah some time in
February 1947, who asked him to come and see him. The Quaid began by
asking him if he accepted the Quaid as the leader of the Muslim, and
whether he would do what he, the Quaid, asked him. Sikander Mirza
writes, he could only say yes. Recalling that meeting with the
Quaid, Mirza continues:-
He then went on to say that he was afraid he was not going to get
Pakistan unless some serious trouble was created, and the best place
to do this way NWFP Province with the tribes. In his view it was
important to demonstrate Muslim anger before the British handed the
country over to Congress. If Pakistan was not conceded by
negotiations we must fight…He wanted me to resign from service, go
into the tribal territory and start a jehad.
This is worth pondering. It was February 1947. Wavell had been
dismissed. The British government had announced that it would hand
over all powers to the Indian by June 1948; Wevall’s going had
caused legitimate concern for Mr. Jinnah. He didn’t know what would
happen next. Communal riots were going on. He thought of something
very dangerous, and that too for NWFP. He bluntly told Sikander
Mirza, in the latter’s words, that “according to his information I
could achieve this if I really tried.”
This shows how Mr. Jinnah has established contacts with government
officials, and also that how the employees of the British rulers
could arrange “jihad” for him. Sikander Mirza writes that he
reflected on the various aspects of the proposals. As he understood:
This could only take the form of raids on border villages… yet I
decided to fall in with Quaid-I-Azam’s plan… I have no desire to be
branded as a man who was found wanting when the time for action
came…With the liberal expenditure of money I would be able to cause
some trouble in Waziristan, Tirah, and Mohmand country. I gave my
estimate of money as one crore (10 Million)….
There had also to be some formal excuse for his suddenly leaving
Delhi.
Mr. Jinnah had already anticipated these requirements. He had the
cover and the money ready. The cover was an appointment with H.H.
the Khan of Kalat and the treasure was provided by H.H, the Nawab of
Bhopal.
Sikandar Mirza went to see the Nawab of Bhopal the same day, and was
immediately handed a sum of Rs. 20,000. According to him, Mr. Jinnah
had also given him the assurance that if anything untoward happened
to him, his family would be taken care of.
Mirza recalls that he immediately got to work. He sent for some of
his trusted men from Dera Ismail Khan, Peshawar and the tribal
areas. After long discussions a plan was drawn up. He was to collect
all the people he knew well and then initiate action in Waziristan,
Tirah and Mohmand. However, before he could proceed any further the
circumstances changed.
Early in May, the Quaid-i-Azam sent for me again and told me that as
Pakistan would be conceded, the Plan would be abandoned.
Mirza goes on to record his opinion about the Quaid. He says that he
was the kind of leader who made his own decisions and accepted no
counsels. He quoted the Quaid himself on this after Pakistan was
born and the Quaid was its governor general. He had made bold to
suggest to the Quaid:
That we must try to be considerate to the Muslim League as after all
they had brought in Pakistan. Jinnah immediately replied: “Who told
you that Muslim League brought in Pakistan? I brought in Pakistan –
with my Stenographer.
The whole episode thus shows how top-most employees of the British
government were ready to render assistance to the Muslim League; and
also that how having failed through constitutional and democratic
means Mr. Jinnah was prepared to initiate a jihad against India just
in order to bring down the Khudai Khidmatgar government in NWFP.
Thirdly, it is also obvious how the government functionaries had
maintained liasion with the tribal areas and their leaders, to the
extent that the latter were ready to wage a war on their own country
at these officials bidding. Also, how the princely states were
generous in giving assistance – in crores (in Million) of those
days!
Toppling the Unionist ministry of Khizar Hayat in Punjab was much
less difficult a proposition. If on one side Muslim league started a
civil disobedience movement against it, on the other communal fire
broke out. Arms and ammunition flowed inform the Frontier and the
tribal areas. Muslim Leaguers’ going to jail following the civil
disobedience was a joke in itself. The Punjab Muslim League
President Mian Iftikharuddin, for instance, used to get the choicest
food from home. It used to be like a feast. He was even permitted to
go and attend parties, and even to spend the nights at home!
In short, if on the one hand the communal riots removed the Hindu
and Sikh members of the assembly out of the way, on the other the
civil disobedience compelled Khizar Hayat to tender his cabinet’s
resignation on March 3, 1947. Since the Muslim League was in no
position to form the government itself the powers to rule were
seized by the British Governor himself under Section 93.
The Hindus and Sikh soon realised that the British were trying to
pave the ground for the Muslim League to come in the province. They
started protest demonstrations. That further inflamed passions, and
the communal loot, arson, killing and abduction of women soon
assumed horrendous proportions.
NWFP, remained the only province out of the Muslim League’s wings.
Here again there was communal rioting and thousands from the tribal
areas took place. The point sought to be made was, if the province
government was not capable of maintaining peace it should resign. If
on the other hand, it resorted to strong measure outcry could be
raised in the press and from the platform that it was perpetrating
tyranny on the Muslim population of the province.
The difference between the Punjab and the Frontier was that the
Unionists were a ministerial party, they did not have political
roots; but here in the Frontier those in control were Khudai
Khidmatgars who were a bold, disciplined organisation.
Muslim League tried all the tricks in its bag to dislodge the
latter. Top leaders from the rest of India were sent on tour to the
Frontier. Real and imaginary tales of Hindu-inspired riots were
spread–especially those of Bihar–in order to inflame Pushtoon
sentiment. There was no limit to the money poured in. And student
delegation came out from Punjab and Aligarh.
A military officer from Punjab who resigned from the service came
stalking the province and triggering disruptive activities. Until
now Khudai Khidmatgars were maintaining exemplary self-control,
carrying on their brave campaign against the British on the
principles of non-violence. But the Muslim League agitation now led
to bomb explosions and even to the killing of non-Muslims. There
were recorded confessions in this respect, cited by Erland Janson in
his book India, Pakistan or Pukhtoonistan.
For instance, the chief instructor of the Hangu Police School used
to supply bomb and give guidance for their use. Alam Khan admitted
to Janson that he was well paid for doing this by Pir of Manki
Sharif. All the government officials in the province were also
aiding the Muslim League in the agitation. The President of the
students federation told Janson that a Captain in the Police
Faizullah Khan, kept a close liaison with them, and whatever
decisions were taken about the agitation at official meetings were
promptly disclosed to them. During public demonstrations the police
took care that their lathis fell everywhere except on their persons.
The Muslim Leaguers sent to jail for civil disobedience and
violation of Section 144, were sentenced for three months, but they
were mostly free to roam the streets during the day and even spend
the nights at home. A friend borrowed my car for a night. Later it
transpired that a friend of his, a Khan from Mardan, used the cart
to go home for the night and return to the Jail the next morning.
About that time, the NWFP assembly had a session. Maj. Khurshid
Anwar arranged that a procession should be taken to the assembly
building and it should create such a racket that the session would
be disrupted. The procession included students and followers of Pir
of Manki. Khurshid Anwar asked the students to stay behind and let
the others be in front. The police indicated to them the limit
beyond which they should not proceed. But the students pushed the
Pir’s followers beyond the line where upon police opened fire, and
some got hit. Khurshid Anwar said, the job was done, all could now
disperse.
The mission is completed. He wanted to shed Muslim blood, now it has
been done – Erland Janson. P-169.
Miscreants like Khurshid Anwar kept themselves active throughout the
province, untouched by government agencies. Hindus and Sikhs were
harassed, robbed and even killed. The British were clearly following
a partisan policy. The British governor, Sir Olaf Carore, and his
subordinates were keen that somehow the ministry should be made to
collapse.
About Caroe, the Viceroy, Wavell, had himself written; “Caroe
himself has never yet reconciled to the idea of our leaving Inida”
(P.329). Caroe was still hoping for Wavell’s Breakdown Plan to come
through, and NWFP, with the tribal on one side and Afghanistan and
the Soviets on the other, was a crucial link in that plan. The
British here were concerned wholly about the interests of the throne
and the crown. They felt that Muslim League could be an instrument
in the promotion of those interests.
When the British saw that neither through communal riots nor through
the Muslim League’s campaign of civil disobedience could the
ministry of Dr. Khan Sahib be dislodged, they turned to yet another
game plan. |
