Chapter 16
Wavell’s Bid for ‘A Bit of India’
THE Viceroy was so keen on Muslim League’s joining the interim
government that he did not even press the latter to fulfil its
commitment to withdraw its July decision against the Cabinet Mission
Plan about a united India. That had been a pre-condition to League’s
entry into the cabinet. Wavell had assured Nehru that Muslim League
would presently call a meeting of its working committee for the
purpose. As Hodson writes.
Jinnah had undertaken…… to call a meeting of the Muslim League
Council and to reverse its decision against the statement of May 16.
The working committee was not summoned until more than three months
later, and then it declined to call the League council to reconsider
the decision of July 1946. (P. 174).
Another oddity was that while the League had joined the government
it was still involved in its direct action against the government!
The viceroy didn’t consider it necessary to point to the anomaly of
the situation and ask the League to rescind its anti-government
call.
On the congress’ suggestion of convening the constituent assembly,
Mr. Jinnah promptly came in with the negative view. He wanted the
interim government to settle down first. The viceroy too no doubt
wanted a respite to compose him self. He was now in the happy
position of not having to face the congress directly. He could fire
his shots from the League’s shoulders.
The more pressing tragedy was that while the congress and the Muslim
League were busy sharing out ministerial posts, the country was
burning in the flames lighted by the ‘direct action’. In the
multiplicity of minor riots, a major Hindu-Muslim flare-up occurred
in October in Noakhali in eastern Bengal; Thousands of innocents
were killed or wounded. If the Hindus were under siege in Bengal,
neighbouring Bihar saw massacre of Muslim men, women and children.
The barbarity, which was carried through November, was devastating.
The whole country got caught up in the wave of communal hatred.
This suited the British books. Wavell calculated that the more the
communal lines hardened the greater would be India’s need for
British presence. Wavell’s own plan of Britain winding up and later
coming back to The Muslim parts of the country was also Best served
by these events, which Furthermore tended to prove the League Thesis
that it was no longer possible for the Hindus and Muslims to live
together in the Same house, of which the inevitable answer Was its
partition into two parts.
The congress proposed that the differences between the two parties
with regard to the grouping system to the May 17 plan could be
referred to the federal court for adjudication and resolution. But
Mr. Jinnah merely wanted acceptance of his own point of view, and
the viceroy went along. As the latter him self recorded:
“They (the congress) were apparently prepared to agree that the
question of whether the sections make the constitution for the
provinces, or the provinces make their own constitutions should be
referred to the federal court, but this Jinnah would not accept (p.
371).
Meanwhile the spread of the communal fire was causing concern to the
congress and the central government. Nehru told Wavell in very
strong terms that while the riots were spreading; Muslim League was
sitting in the interim government agitating for equal representation
and pursuing the politics of ‘direct action against the government.
The League should be finally told, urged Nehru that it should either
declare acceptance of the May 16 plan and join the constituent
assembly or leave the government. If it doesn’t do either then the
congress would have no choice but to resign itself and hand over the
country to Wavell and the Muslim League. The congress also urged the
viceroy to call a session of the constituent assembly.
Wavell was thus left with no option. On Nov. 20, 1946, he summoned
the assembly for December 9, 1946. Mr. Jinnah immediately announced
that Muslim League would not participate. He also came out with the
declaration that Muslim League was reverting to its rejection of the
cabinet mission plan. This placed Wavell in a difficult position,
for no justification was now left for the League to continue in the
interim government. But, oddly, he did not consider it necessary to
point out to the League that it had entered the interim government
on the clear undertaking that it would withdraw its repudiation of
the cabinet plan.
What Wavell did was to compile a detailed report on the conditions
of the country for the benefit of the British government. The
operative part, in Hodson’s view, was: “If he agreed and they (H.M.
Government) surrendered to the congress point of view, the result
would be something approaching civil war, threatening the break up
of Indian army and chaos throughout India,” (p.176).
His recommendation was that two representatives each from the
congress and the Muslim League should go and have the issues
directly resolved with the British government.
Mr. Jinnah and Nawabzada Liaquat Ali khan accepted the invitation
but the congress declined. The latter argued that Britain’s concern
wasn’t an equitable resolution of the issue: It was playing with the
future of the country just in order to please one of the parties.
The British prime Minister made a personal appeal to Mr. Nehru to
come, and the latter then agreed, although Mr. Vallabh Bhai Patel
still held back. An interesting side was that Mr. Jinnah there upon
insisted that he too should hear directly from British prime
Minister. According to Wavell, “perhaps he thought that as Nehru has
had a personal appeal from the P.M. it behooved his dignity to have
one too.” (p. 385)
Wavell’s concern in all this was of course that Muslim League should
somehow be kept within the interim government despite the fact that
Mr. Jinnah’s repudiation of the cabinet Mission had knocked all
bases out of it. But Churchill’s last advice had kept echoing in his
ears. The ‘British prime Minister had sent him off on his assignment
in India with the parting counsel: “keep a bit of India”. And that
is what he had been trying to do, even in the conception of his
“Breakdown plan”.
The party leaders along with Wavell reached London on December 3.
Wavell immediately presented his detailed note to the cabinet. He
concluded on the point that there was no possibility of reaching any
compromise with the congress and that the imminent result would be a
confrontation.
The only course to avoid it, wrote Wavell, was to act on his
Breakdown plan. In other words, that the majority provinces of the
congress should be granted independence and the British along with
their army, their bureaucracy and their families should shift to the
Muslim majority areas. The congress leaders, he said, “are not ready
yet for an open breach with HMG. Such a breach is however a
possibility and we can only face it if we have a definite policy and
a breakdown plan” (p. 388)
It seemed obvious that Wavell had brought the congress and Muslim
League leaders to London only in order to get his own scheme decided
upon by the government and then make these leaders accept it. He
expected easy acceptance by the government since it aimed at saving
a part of India for the British, a part, too, that could block the
soviets on one side and contain china on the other. This way
independent India could also be kept under control. The Muslim
League appeared willing and the problem seemed more or less resolved
since there could be no reconciliation between the Muslim League and
the congress.
In the event, however, the conference ended in failure. The leaders
departed. Wavell intended to stay behind to try and push his scheme
with the HMG but the latter sent him back too. He left his secretary
George Abell behind so that he could canvass his proposal with the
government and keeps him informed. Eventually, however, on Jan 8,
1947.
“George Abell telegraphed to say that the cabinet at home has gone
back completely and refuses to have anything to do with the
Breakdown plan, so he is returning at once. Wavell, p. 408”.
What the British government did as a result of the conference was to
accept the Muslim League point of view with regard to the grouping
system. The provinces’ individual was ended and it was ruled that
they would take decisions collectively within their groups. In
effect thus, the preponderant Punjab became the will of Group-B,
with Sindh and NWFP tagging along all its decision willingly or
unwillingly. Similarly, in the east the powers were delivered to
Bengal with Assam an ineffective partner.
As scheduled, the constituent assembly of the country met on
December 9 Muslim League did not participate. The session passed an
objectives resolution which laid down the directive principles and
the policy with regard to the provinces and the princely states.
Except for three federal subjects all powers were transferred to the
provinces. Committees were set up for the different departments and
vacancies were left in them for the Muslim League.
On January 5, 1947 the All-India congress Committee held its
meeting. It declared acceptance of the British government’s
announcement of transferring powers to the groups rather then to the
provinces.
This created a new snag for the Muslim League. Its objection over
the groups vs. the provinces was also resolved. The party called its
working committee meeting on January 29, 1947 in Karachi. Lengthy
grievances, doubts and suspicions were retailed and the final
decision announced. It was said that since the congress had not
accepted the cabinet Mission plan with an open heart, the Muslim
League was no longer willing to approve it. Accordingly, went on the
Muslim League declaration, since the plan had failed, the government
should immediately bring to an end all actions taken in pursuance to
it and should dissolve the country’s elected constituent assembly.
It remained as an anomaly that while the league had rejected the
cabinet Mission plan, refused to sit in the national constituent
assembly, demanding that it be dissolved, and called for all actions
springing from the plan to be declared null and void, and yet it was
unabashedly occupying its seats in the interim government which too
was a product of that plan. Lord Wavell too kept his eyes closed to
the contradiction in the situation.
THE Viceroy was so keen on Muslim League’s joining the interim
government that he did not even press the latter to fulfil its
commitment to withdraw its July decision against the Cabinet Mission
Plan about a united India. That had been a pre-condition to League’s
entry into the cabinet. Wavell had assured Nehru that Muslim League
would presently call a meeting of its working committee for the
purpose. As Hodson writes.
Jinnah had undertaken…… to call a meeting of the Muslim League
Council and to reverse its decision against the statement of May 16.
The working committee was not summoned until more than three months
later, and then it declined to call the League council to reconsider
the decision of July 1946. (P. 174).
Another oddity was that while the League had joined the government
it was still involved in its direct action against the government!
The viceroy didn’t consider it necessary to point to the anomaly of
the situation and ask the League to rescind its anti-government
call.
On the congress’ suggestion of convening the constituent assembly,
Mr. Jinnah promptly came in with the negative view. He wanted the
interim government to settle down first. The viceroy too no doubt
wanted a respite to compose him self. He was now in the happy
position of not having to face the congress directly. He could fire
his shots from the League’s shoulders.
The more pressing tragedy was that while the congress and the Muslim
League were busy sharing out ministerial posts, the country was
burning in the flames lighted by the ‘direct action’. In the
multiplicity of minor riots, a major Hindu-Muslim flare-up occurred
in October in Noakhali in eastern Bengal; Thousands of innocents
were killed or wounded. If the Hindus were under siege in Bengal,
neighbouring Bihar saw massacre of Muslim men, women and children.
The barbarity, which was carried through November, was devastating.
The whole country got caught up in the wave of communal hatred.
This suited the British books. Wavell calculated that the more the
communal lines hardened the greater would be India’s need for
British presence. Wavell’s own plan of Britain winding up and later
coming back to The Muslim parts of the country was also Best served
by these events, which Furthermore tended to prove the League Thesis
that it was no longer possible for the Hindus and Muslims to live
together in the Same house, of which the inevitable answer Was its
partition into two parts.
The congress proposed that the differences between the two parties
with regard to the grouping system to the May 17 plan could be
referred to the federal court for adjudication and resolution. But
Mr. Jinnah merely wanted acceptance of his own point of view, and
the viceroy went along. As the latter him self recorded:
“They (the congress) were apparently prepared to agree that the
question of whether the sections make the constitution for the
provinces, or the provinces make their own constitutions should be
referred to the federal court, but this Jinnah would not accept (p.
371).
Meanwhile the spread of the communal fire was causing concern to the
congress and the central government. Nehru told Wavell in very
strong terms that while the riots were spreading; Muslim League was
sitting in the interim government agitating for equal representation
and pursuing the politics of ‘direct action against the government.
The League should be finally told, urged Nehru that it should either
declare acceptance of the May 16 plan and join the constituent
assembly or leave the government. If it doesn’t do either then the
congress would have no choice but to resign itself and hand over the
country to Wavell and the Muslim League. The congress also urged the
viceroy to call a session of the constituent assembly.
Wavell was thus left with no option. On Nov. 20, 1946, he summoned
the assembly for December 9, 1946. Mr. Jinnah immediately announced
that Muslim League would not participate. He also came out with the
declaration that Muslim League was reverting to its rejection of the
cabinet mission plan. This placed Wavell in a difficult position,
for no justification was now left for the League to continue in the
interim government. But, oddly, he did not consider it necessary to
point out to the League that it had entered the interim government
on the clear undertaking that it would withdraw its repudiation of
the cabinet plan.
What Wavell did was to compile a detailed report on the conditions
of the country for the benefit of the British government. The
operative part, in Hodson’s view, was: “If he agreed and they (H.M.
Government) surrendered to the congress point of view, the result
would be something approaching civil war, threatening the break up
of Indian army and chaos throughout India,” (p.176).
His recommendation was that two representatives each from the
congress and the Muslim League should go and have the issues
directly resolved with the British government.
Mr. Jinnah and Nawabzada Liaquat Ali khan accepted the invitation
but the congress declined. The latter argued that Britain’s concern
wasn’t an equitable resolution of the issue: It was playing with the
future of the country just in order to please one of the parties.
The British prime Minister made a personal appeal to Mr. Nehru to
come, and the latter then agreed, although Mr. Vallabh Bhai Patel
still held back. An interesting side was that Mr. Jinnah there upon
insisted that he too should hear directly from British prime
Minister. According to Wavell, “perhaps he thought that as Nehru has
had a personal appeal from the P.M. it behooved his dignity to have
one too.” (p. 385)
Wavell’s concern in all this was of course that Muslim League should
somehow be kept within the interim government despite the fact that
Mr. Jinnah’s repudiation of the cabinet Mission had knocked all
bases out of it. But Churchill’s last advice had kept echoing in his
ears. The ‘British prime Minister had sent him off on his assignment
in India with the parting counsel: “keep a bit of India”. And that
is what he had been trying to do, even in the conception of his
“Breakdown plan”.
The party leaders along with Wavell reached London on December 3.
Wavell immediately presented his detailed note to the cabinet. He
concluded on the point that there was no possibility of reaching any
compromise with the congress and that the imminent result would be a
confrontation.
The only course to avoid it, wrote Wavell, was to act on his
Breakdown plan. In other words, that the majority provinces of the
congress should be granted independence and the British along with
their army, their bureaucracy and their families should shift to the
Muslim majority areas. The congress leaders, he said, “are not ready
yet for an open breach with HMG. Such a breach is however a
possibility and we can only face it if we have a definite policy and
a breakdown plan” (p. 388)
It seemed obvious that Wavell had brought the congress and Muslim
League leaders to London only in order to get his own scheme decided
upon by the government and then make these leaders accept it. He
expected easy acceptance by the government since it aimed at saving
a part of India for the British, a part, too, that could block the
soviets on one side and contain china on the other. This way
independent India could also be kept under control. The Muslim
League appeared willing and the problem seemed more or less resolved
since there could be no reconciliation between the Muslim League and
the congress.
In the event, however, the conference ended in failure. The leaders
departed. Wavell intended to stay behind to try and push his scheme
with the HMG but the latter sent him back too. He left his secretary
George Abell behind so that he could canvass his proposal with the
government and keeps him informed. Eventually, however, on Jan 8,
1947.
“George Abell telegraphed to say that the cabinet at home has gone
back completely and refuses to have anything to do with the
Breakdown plan, so he is returning at once. Wavell, p. 408”.
What the British government did as a result of the conference was to
accept the Muslim League point of view with regard to the grouping
system. The provinces’ individual was ended and it was ruled that
they would take decisions collectively within their groups. In
effect thus, the preponderant Punjab became the will of Group-B,
with Sindh and NWFP tagging along all its decision willingly or
unwillingly. Similarly, in the east the powers were delivered to
Bengal with Assam an ineffective partner.
As scheduled, the constituent assembly of the country met on
December 9 Muslim League did not participate. The session passed an
objectives resolution which laid down the directive principles and
the policy with regard to the provinces and the princely states.
Except for three federal subjects all powers were transferred to the
provinces. Committees were set up for the different departments and
vacancies were left in them for the Muslim League.
On January 5, 1947 the All-India congress Committee held its
meeting. It declared acceptance of the British government’s
announcement of transferring powers to the groups rather then to the
provinces.
This created a new snag for the Muslim League. Its objection over
the groups vs. the provinces was also resolved. The party called its
working committee meeting on January 29, 1947 in Karachi. Lengthy
grievances, doubts and suspicions were retailed and the final
decision announced. It was said that since the congress had not
accepted the cabinet Mission plan with an open heart, the Muslim
League was no longer willing to approve it. Accordingly, went on the
Muslim League declaration, since the plan had failed, the government
should immediately bring to an end all actions taken in pursuance to
it and should dissolve the country’s elected constituent assembly.
It remained as an anomaly that while the league had rejected the
cabinet Mission plan, refused to sit in the national constituent
assembly, demanding that it be dissolved, and called for all actions
springing from the plan to be declared null and void, and yet it was
unabashedly occupying its seats in the interim government which too
was a product of that plan. Lord Wavell too kept his eyes closed to
the contradiction in the situation. |
