Chapter 14
Federation Defeated
AFTER the end of the War general election was held in Britain. The
Conservatives lost and the Labour formed the government, with
Clement Attlee replacing Winston Churchill as the prime minister.
Here in India too, Wavell announced an election. The hope was that
following the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps and the end of the
Simla Conference, the Muslim League would be able to do well at the
polls.
It was also known in certain quarters that the British had almost
decided to concede the demand for Pakistan and they were not
prepared to accept any Muslim representative except through the
Muslim League. Moreover, when it was decided to have separated
rather than join electorate (Muslim voting for Muslim candidates,
non-Muslims for non-Muslim) the way seemed cleared for the Muslim
League. The result was every businessman, industrialist and
capitalist rushed to the League; the Muslim princes became keen to
extend their patronage to the League for their future safeguard; and
the official began openly to work for that party. Wavell himself
directed his Secretary of Interior “to impress on everyone that to
back Congress at the expense of loyalists was not my policy”. Thus
is his view there were only two parties in fray, the Congress and
the loyalists.
After the election, Britain sent out a three-member Cabinet Mission,
comprising the secretary of State for India himself, Sir Stafford
Cripps, and Mr. A.G. Alexander. They set to work immediately, and
first resolved to bring Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru
together. Wavell writes in his book:
“Cripps and the other ministers thought that there ought to be a
meeting between Jinnah and Nehru, not with any hope of agreement,
but purely for publicity value, to show that we had our best to
secure agreement”. (Page-248).
This again fully exposed the British dishonesty.
For the second Simla Conference they invited only the Congress and
Muslim League members. The Congress delegation consisted of Maulana
Abul Kalam Azad, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabh Bahi Patel and
Bacha Khan. Muslim League had Mr. Jinnah, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali
Khan, Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan, and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar.
There were thus two Hindus and six Muslims at the Conference.
The beginning was not very auspicious. According to Wavell, when on
arrival Maulana Azad stretched his hand to greet Mr. Jinnah, the
latter remained motionless. He refused to shake hands with a fellow
Muslim, though he was ready to greet the Kafir British deferentially
and had had no objection in shaking hands with Hindus or with
ladies.
Mr. Jinnah showed full consciousness of the fact that he had a
crucial role. His refusal to agree had caused the collapse of the
first Simla Conference. He was now even more firmly resolved on his
stand. He wouldn’t discuss anything short of Pakistan, while the
Congress wasn’t yet ready to contemplate partition of the country.
This conference to fail on the issue that the Muslim League wanted
to be accepted as the exclusive representative body of the Muslims.
The Cabinet Mission had given notice that if the Congress and the
Muslim League did not agree on a settlement between themselves they,
the Mission, would offer a proposal of their own. Accordingly, on
May 19, 1946, they announced the following formula.
First, that India would be a federation with just three federal
subjects: defence, external affairs and communications.
Second, that the federation units would constitute three groups:
A- Made up of six provinces: Bombay, Madras, Bihar, Orisa, and U.P.
& C.P.
B- Comprising Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan
C- Comprising Bengal and Assam.
The newly elected provincial assemblies were to elect members to a
central constituent assembly which would draw up a constitution for
the federation and would also be the representative body working out
with the British Government the details of independence and transfer
of power.
The constitutions for the provinces were to be drawn up by the
provincial assemblies. If the provinces concerned so wished, the
different groups could combine and have a common constitution making
body. Besides, every province was allowed the right of secession
from its group after ten years.
It these proposals are closely examined it would seem that they had
met the demands of both the parties. Congress desired the
continuation of Indian unity, and this was guaranteed through a weak
federal government. The Muslim League was suspicious of the Hindus’
numerical superiority and so the zonal division took care of that
fear. Provincial autonomy had also been ensured. In fact except for
the three federal subjects the formula virtually conceded Pakistan.
The Cabinet Mission also recommended that an interim government be
set up at the centre headed by the Viceroy at the same time as
elections are held to the constituent assembly.
One problem that the plan posed for the Muslim League was that its
entire top leadership came from non-Muslim majority provinces, which
would leave them in the grouping of the provinces. That included Mr.
Jinnah and Nawabzada Liaquat Alia Khan themselves. According to
Wavell the first clarification that Muslim League sought was whether
a person of one province could be voted to a constituent assembly of
a different group of provinces. After that difficulty was removed
these leaders, who belonged to Bombay and U.P., were elected from
seats allocated to Bengal.
The distribution of constituent assembly seats among Muslims and
non-Muslims of different provinces in the three groups was as
follows:-
Group – A
Non-Muslim Muslims
Madras 45 4
Bombay 19 2
U.P. 47 8
Bihar 31 5
C.P. 16 1
Assam 9 0
Total 167 20
Group – B
Punjab 8 16
(+4Sikh)
NWFP 0 3
Sindh 1 3
Total 9 22
(+4Sikh)
Group – C
Non-Muslim Muslim
Bengal 27 33
Assam 7 3
Total 34 36
The Muslim League at once saw that the 34:36 ratios in Group C were
a precarious one. If even one or two Muslim Members were at any time
won over by the other side the balance would be upset. In Punjab
also the 12 to 16 division did not make for a very comfortable
position. There was another difficulty in this province. The
election three was won by the Unionists and that party included
Hindus and Sikhs as well as Muslims.
The Mission had made emphatically clear that any part that did not
fully accept these proposals would be left out of the government.
Muslim League knew that if it held out it would be left behind.
The Muslim League working committee held a meeting to consider the
Plan, and announced its acceptance of it on June 6, 1946. This meant
that it ha accepted the idea of a federal India and had relinquished
its demand for a sovereign Pakistan.
The League was however convinced that the Congress would reject the
proposals. It would object to the composition of the groups and the
arbitrary assigning of the provinces to one or the other group. But
three weeks later, on June 25, 1946, the Congress too announced its
acceptance. Wavell was among those most disappointed. His Breakdown
Plan had been denied its chance. He writes about the day of the
Congress announcement:
The worst day yet… Congress has accepted the statement of May 16…
Now Cripps having assured me categorically that the Congress would
never accept the statement….
Congress manoeuvres have now put us in a very difficult position,
both with Mr. Jinnah and the formation of an interim government…
unless we decide that the Congress is dishonest, as it is in fact,
and refuse to regard this as acceptance….
We then discussed the Congress letter of acceptance, which is really
dishonest acceptance, but it is so cleverly worded that it had to be
regarded as an acceptance (pp. 303, 304, 305).
Wavell thus felt deeply frustrated. The Cabinet Mission, that
included the minister concerned with India himself, had clipped his
wings. They had assumed the initiative themselves. They were
disregarding Wavell’s counsels and taking their own decisions. But
Wavells hadn’t lost heart. Once the mission went back he would again
be the master of himself. When the Muslim League abandoned the
Pakistan demand under the take–it–or–leave–it ultimatum of the
Cabinet Mission, he was greatly upset. He declared that they would
have an impact on the British Empire itself. He had been assuring
the Muslim League that if it refused to reach an agreement, the
government wouldn’t be handed over to the Congress. But the Mission
had adopted a wholly different position – that it would be the party
not agreeing that would be left out and the scheme would go right
ahead. That displeased him immensely and he even threatened to
resign. According to Hodson, “The viceroy was not prepared to carry
on if they gave way to Congress demands” (The Great Divide, P. 51).
He kept insisting that the Congress had not accepted the proposals
in good faith. He then suggested that he be allowed to form a
government right away while the question of its political
composition could be resolved afterwards. ‘But he was overruled on
that too.
A distraught Wavell then wrote to Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Jawararlal
Nehru on July 22, saying that the interim government would have 14
ministers – six of these from the Congress, including one Harijan;
five from Muslim League, and a Sikh and two others would be
nominated by the Viceroy.
The congress asked for certain assurance. First, that the cabinet
should be independent and Viceroy should have no power of veto – in
other words that the Viceroy should only act as a constitutional
head.
The Congress also had reservations over the nomination of members of
the minority communities, but, it seems that the real crunch came
over the right of the smaller provinces. The Congress argued that
within the three provincial groups, the bigger province with its
larger number of votes would always outvote the smaller ones. Thus
in Group C Assam could never have an independent opinion against
Bengal, and in Group B Punjab would always outvote Sindh and NWFP
together. The solution the Congress pressed for was that approval of
each province should be considered necessary. The Muslim League
however insisted on voting by groups.
Mr. Jinnah summoned an All-India council meeting of his party in
Bombay to review the whole situation. The meeting passed a
resolution on July 27, 1946, which complained that since the
Congress had an absolute majority in the central constituent
assembly it was in a position to take whatever decisions it liked.
It went on to make a series of criticisms of the Cabinet Mission
plan. The council was also said to have authorised its working
committee to launch ‘direct action’ for the achievement of its
political objectives. Mr. Jinnah apparently looked around him and
noted a line-up of Nawabs, Nawabzadas, Khan Bahadurs, and Khan
Sahibs etc. So it was also decided that the Muslim Leaguers would
renounce all the British-awarded titles and decorations.
Mr. Jinnah objected to the composition of the interim government
also. For one thing Muslim League had not been given equal
representation with the Congress. Secondly, Congress had not been
barred from nominating a Muslim from its side. Thirdly, communal
voting–which is to say, an issue concerning a particular community
would be decided only by representatives of that community–had not
been provided for.
Who could have admitted these objections? Muslims constituted a
population of 10 crore (100Million) against 30 crore (300 Million)
non-Muslims. Besides after the election Muslim League got only two
provinces. Sindh and Punjab went to the Unionists and Nationalists.
The rest were with the Congress. How could there be a parity, in the
central cabinet? Similarly it was strange logic that the Congress
should not nominate a Muslim–Which to say that just because Mr.
Jinnah said so the Congress should accept that it was a party only
of the non-Muslims! Besides, one with a genuine concern for Muslims
should have welcomed a Muslim being made a minister from the other
side as well.
The fact is, the Muslim League was in a quandary. After the first
Simla Conference it had deduced from Wavell’s attitude and
assurances that Pakistan had been decided upon. Secondly, drawing
the necessary inferences from the British declaration that they
accepted only Muslim League as representative of the Muslims, the
merchants, industrialists, princes and Muslim government officials
had come out openly and unstintedly in support of the Muslim League
expecting open-handed opportunities of profit, promotions etc, once
Pakistan was formed. The Cabinet Mission Plan and the acceptance of
the federal principle sent their hopes crashing. Thirdly, since 1940
Muslim League had talked of little outside the context of Pakistan.
It had given it a completely religious, rather than merely
political, halo. Now with the apparent relinquishment of that demand
all that talk of two nations, all those passionate, speeches and
endless debates had been forgotten. What had continually been dinned
as a religious compulsion, as an immutability and suddenly been
bargained away for political reasons. The Muslim League had fought
the election on the demand for Pakistan. How could it face the
electorate now when it seemed to have given up that vision of
paradise that it had conjured up?
The fact was that Muslim League had not acquired any basic
political, national or organisational strength of its own. The
prominent people within it were almost all beneficiaries of British
favours or awards. Its strength still essentially derived from the
British support. The moment that support weakened it began wobbling.
The British too were now in a dilemma. They had spent the past
several years arguing that since the various Indian communities were
not agreed amongst themselves they were obliged to keep power in
their own hands. But now that plea was lost. The Cabinet Mission
proposals had been accepted by both sides. The ‘Breakdown Plan’ was
left in a limbo.
After the Cabinet Mission left for home, Lord Wavell set up a
central government of officials to carry on as in the past and keep
the two parties engaged in talks. But Whitehall was insisting that
since the Muslim League had rejected the Plan, Congress also should
be invited to form government. Wavell wrote back:
I would say that HMG have the fullest intention of handing over
power to Indians… But they do not recognise Congress as representing
all India, and have no intention of handing over power to Congress
alone. (P323)
It was a strange double-faced tactics. There were two measures, one
for the congress and other for the Muslim League. The objection
Britain rose against Congress it never leveled against the League.
Experience had shown that whenever the British became firm Muslim
League relented–even to the extent of abandoning the demand for
Pakistan.
However, the constitutional deadlock created unrest in the country.
Strikes began to be called. The rulers found it imperative to make
up with one of the parties. Wavell called Jawaharlal Nehru to talk
with him about interim government. He pressed for his reaching some
accord with Muslim League also even suggested that its seats on the
cabinet should be left vacant. He was helpless. He had to invite the
Congress to form the ministry. He wrote:
I dislike the idea of having an interim government dominated by one
party, but I feel I must try to get Congress in as soon as possible…
Secretary of State Cable approving my proposed approach to Nehru. I
don’t like it. (PP 324.329).
AFTER the end of the War general election was held in Britain. The
Conservatives lost and the Labour formed the government, with
Clement Attlee replacing Winston Churchill as the prime minister.
Here in India too, Wavell announced an election. The hope was that
following the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps and the end of the
Simla Conference, the Muslim League would be able to do well at the
polls.
It was also known in certain quarters that the British had almost
decided to concede the demand for Pakistan and they were not
prepared to accept any Muslim representative except through the
Muslim League. Moreover, when it was decided to have separated
rather than join electorate (Muslim voting for Muslim candidates,
non-Muslims for non-Muslim) the way seemed cleared for the Muslim
League. The result was every businessman, industrialist and
capitalist rushed to the League; the Muslim princes became keen to
extend their patronage to the League for their future safeguard; and
the official began openly to work for that party. Wavell himself
directed his Secretary of Interior “to impress on everyone that to
back Congress at the expense of loyalists was not my policy”. Thus
is his view there were only two parties in fray, the Congress and
the loyalists.
After the election, Britain sent out a three-member Cabinet Mission,
comprising the secretary of State for India himself, Sir Stafford
Cripps, and Mr. A.G. Alexander. They set to work immediately, and
first resolved to bring Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru
together. Wavell writes in his book:
“Cripps and the other ministers thought that there ought to be a
meeting between Jinnah and Nehru, not with any hope of agreement,
but purely for publicity value, to show that we had our best to
secure agreement”. (Page-248).
This again fully exposed the British dishonesty.
For the second Simla Conference they invited only the Congress and
Muslim League members. The Congress delegation consisted of Maulana
Abul Kalam Azad, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabh Bahi Patel and
Bacha Khan. Muslim League had Mr. Jinnah, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali
Khan, Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan, and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar.
There were thus two Hindus and six Muslims at the Conference.
The beginning was not very auspicious. According to Wavell, when on
arrival Maulana Azad stretched his hand to greet Mr. Jinnah, the
latter remained motionless. He refused to shake hands with a fellow
Muslim, though he was ready to greet the Kafir British deferentially
and had had no objection in shaking hands with Hindus or with
ladies.
Mr. Jinnah showed full consciousness of the fact that he had a
crucial role. His refusal to agree had caused the collapse of the
first Simla Conference. He was now even more firmly resolved on his
stand. He wouldn’t discuss anything short of Pakistan, while the
Congress wasn’t yet ready to contemplate partition of the country.
This conference to fail on the issue that the Muslim League wanted
to be accepted as the exclusive representative body of the Muslims.
The Cabinet Mission had given notice that if the Congress and the
Muslim League did not agree on a settlement between themselves they,
the Mission, would offer a proposal of their own. Accordingly, on
May 19, 1946, they announced the following formula.
First, that India would be a federation with just three federal
subjects: defence, external affairs and communications.
Second, that the federation units would constitute three groups:
A- Made up of six provinces: Bombay, Madras, Bihar, Orisa, and U.P.
& C.P.
B- Comprising Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan
C- Comprising Bengal and Assam.
The newly elected provincial assemblies were to elect members to a
central constituent assembly which would draw up a constitution for
the federation and would also be the representative body working out
with the British Government the details of independence and transfer
of power.
The constitutions for the provinces were to be drawn up by the
provincial assemblies. If the provinces concerned so wished, the
different groups could combine and have a common constitution making
body. Besides, every province was allowed the right of secession
from its group after ten years.
It these proposals are closely examined it would seem that they had
met the demands of both the parties. Congress desired the
continuation of Indian unity, and this was guaranteed through a weak
federal government. The Muslim League was suspicious of the Hindus’
numerical superiority and so the zonal division took care of that
fear. Provincial autonomy had also been ensured. In fact except for
the three federal subjects the formula virtually conceded Pakistan.
The Cabinet Mission also recommended that an interim government be
set up at the centre headed by the Viceroy at the same time as
elections are held to the constituent assembly.
One problem that the plan posed for the Muslim League was that its
entire top leadership came from non-Muslim majority provinces, which
would leave them in the grouping of the provinces. That included Mr.
Jinnah and Nawabzada Liaquat Alia Khan themselves. According to
Wavell the first clarification that Muslim League sought was whether
a person of one province could be voted to a constituent assembly of
a different group of provinces. After that difficulty was removed
these leaders, who belonged to Bombay and U.P., were elected from
seats allocated to Bengal.
The distribution of constituent assembly seats among Muslims and
non-Muslims of different provinces in the three groups was as
follows:-
Group – A
Non-Muslim Muslims
Madras 45 4
Bombay 19 2
U.P. 47 8
Bihar 31 5
C.P. 16 1
Assam 9 0
Total 167 20
Group – B
Punjab 8 16
(+4Sikh)
NWFP 0 3
Sindh 1 3
Total 9 22
(+4Sikh)
Group – C
Non-Muslim Muslim
Bengal 27 33
Assam 7 3
Total 34 36
The Muslim League at once saw that the 34:36 ratios in Group C were
a precarious one. If even one or two Muslim Members were at any time
won over by the other side the balance would be upset. In Punjab
also the 12 to 16 division did not make for a very comfortable
position. There was another difficulty in this province. The
election three was won by the Unionists and that party included
Hindus and Sikhs as well as Muslims.
The Mission had made emphatically clear that any part that did not
fully accept these proposals would be left out of the government.
Muslim League knew that if it held out it would be left behind.
The Muslim League working committee held a meeting to consider the
Plan, and announced its acceptance of it on June 6, 1946. This meant
that it ha accepted the idea of a federal India and had relinquished
its demand for a sovereign Pakistan.
The League was however convinced that the Congress would reject the
proposals. It would object to the composition of the groups and the
arbitrary assigning of the provinces to one or the other group. But
three weeks later, on June 25, 1946, the Congress too announced its
acceptance. Wavell was among those most disappointed. His Breakdown
Plan had been denied its chance. He writes about the day of the
Congress announcement:
The worst day yet… Congress has accepted the statement of May 16…
Now Cripps having assured me categorically that the Congress would
never accept the statement….
Congress manoeuvres have now put us in a very difficult position,
both with Mr. Jinnah and the formation of an interim government…
unless we decide that the Congress is dishonest, as it is in fact,
and refuse to regard this as acceptance….
We then discussed the Congress letter of acceptance, which is really
dishonest acceptance, but it is so cleverly worded that it had to be
regarded as an acceptance (pp. 303, 304, 305).
Wavell thus felt deeply frustrated. The Cabinet Mission, that
included the minister concerned with India himself, had clipped his
wings. They had assumed the initiative themselves. They were
disregarding Wavell’s counsels and taking their own decisions. But
Wavells hadn’t lost heart. Once the mission went back he would again
be the master of himself. When the Muslim League abandoned the
Pakistan demand under the take–it–or–leave–it ultimatum of the
Cabinet Mission, he was greatly upset. He declared that they would
have an impact on the British Empire itself. He had been assuring
the Muslim League that if it refused to reach an agreement, the
government wouldn’t be handed over to the Congress. But the Mission
had adopted a wholly different position – that it would be the party
not agreeing that would be left out and the scheme would go right
ahead. That displeased him immensely and he even threatened to
resign. According to Hodson, “The viceroy was not prepared to carry
on if they gave way to Congress demands” (The Great Divide, P. 51).
He kept insisting that the Congress had not accepted the proposals
in good faith. He then suggested that he be allowed to form a
government right away while the question of its political
composition could be resolved afterwards. ‘But he was overruled on
that too.
A distraught Wavell then wrote to Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Jawararlal
Nehru on July 22, saying that the interim government would have 14
ministers – six of these from the Congress, including one Harijan;
five from Muslim League, and a Sikh and two others would be
nominated by the Viceroy.
The congress asked for certain assurance. First, that the cabinet
should be independent and Viceroy should have no power of veto – in
other words that the Viceroy should only act as a constitutional
head.
The Congress also had reservations over the nomination of members of
the minority communities, but, it seems that the real crunch came
over the right of the smaller provinces. The Congress argued that
within the three provincial groups, the bigger province with its
larger number of votes would always outvote the smaller ones. Thus
in Group C Assam could never have an independent opinion against
Bengal, and in Group B Punjab would always outvote Sindh and NWFP
together. The solution the Congress pressed for was that approval of
each province should be considered necessary. The Muslim League
however insisted on voting by groups.
Mr. Jinnah summoned an All-India council meeting of his party in
Bombay to review the whole situation. The meeting passed a
resolution on July 27, 1946, which complained that since the
Congress had an absolute majority in the central constituent
assembly it was in a position to take whatever decisions it liked.
It went on to make a series of criticisms of the Cabinet Mission
plan. The council was also said to have authorised its working
committee to launch ‘direct action’ for the achievement of its
political objectives. Mr. Jinnah apparently looked around him and
noted a line-up of Nawabs, Nawabzadas, Khan Bahadurs, and Khan
Sahibs etc. So it was also decided that the Muslim Leaguers would
renounce all the British-awarded titles and decorations.
Mr. Jinnah objected to the composition of the interim government
also. For one thing Muslim League had not been given equal
representation with the Congress. Secondly, Congress had not been
barred from nominating a Muslim from its side. Thirdly, communal
voting–which is to say, an issue concerning a particular community
would be decided only by representatives of that community–had not
been provided for.
Who could have admitted these objections? Muslims constituted a
population of 10 crore (100Million) against 30 crore (300 Million)
non-Muslims. Besides after the election Muslim League got only two
provinces. Sindh and Punjab went to the Unionists and Nationalists.
The rest were with the Congress. How could there be a parity, in the
central cabinet? Similarly it was strange logic that the Congress
should not nominate a Muslim–Which to say that just because Mr.
Jinnah said so the Congress should accept that it was a party only
of the non-Muslims! Besides, one with a genuine concern for Muslims
should have welcomed a Muslim being made a minister from the other
side as well.
The fact is, the Muslim League was in a quandary. After the first
Simla Conference it had deduced from Wavell’s attitude and
assurances that Pakistan had been decided upon. Secondly, drawing
the necessary inferences from the British declaration that they
accepted only Muslim League as representative of the Muslims, the
merchants, industrialists, princes and Muslim government officials
had come out openly and unstintedly in support of the Muslim League
expecting open-handed opportunities of profit, promotions etc, once
Pakistan was formed. The Cabinet Mission Plan and the acceptance of
the federal principle sent their hopes crashing. Thirdly, since 1940
Muslim League had talked of little outside the context of Pakistan.
It had given it a completely religious, rather than merely
political, halo. Now with the apparent relinquishment of that demand
all that talk of two nations, all those passionate, speeches and
endless debates had been forgotten. What had continually been dinned
as a religious compulsion, as an immutability and suddenly been
bargained away for political reasons. The Muslim League had fought
the election on the demand for Pakistan. How could it face the
electorate now when it seemed to have given up that vision of
paradise that it had conjured up?
The fact was that Muslim League had not acquired any basic
political, national or organisational strength of its own. The
prominent people within it were almost all beneficiaries of British
favours or awards. Its strength still essentially derived from the
British support. The moment that support weakened it began wobbling.
The British too were now in a dilemma. They had spent the past
several years arguing that since the various Indian communities were
not agreed amongst themselves they were obliged to keep power in
their own hands. But now that plea was lost. The Cabinet Mission
proposals had been accepted by both sides. The ‘Breakdown Plan’ was
left in a limbo.
After the Cabinet Mission left for home, Lord Wavell set up a
central government of officials to carry on as in the past and keep
the two parties engaged in talks. But Whitehall was insisting that
since the Muslim League had rejected the Plan, Congress also should
be invited to form government. Wavell wrote back:
I would say that HMG have the fullest intention of handing over
power to Indians… But they do not recognise Congress as representing
all India, and have no intention of handing over power to Congress
alone. (P323)
It was a strange double-faced tactics. There were two measures, one
for the congress and other for the Muslim League. The objection
Britain rose against Congress it never leveled against the League.
Experience had shown that whenever the British became firm Muslim
League relented–even to the extent of abandoning the demand for
Pakistan.
However, the constitutional deadlock created unrest in the country.
Strikes began to be called. The rulers found it imperative to make
up with one of the parties. Wavell called Jawaharlal Nehru to talk
with him about interim government. He pressed for his reaching some
accord with Muslim League also even suggested that its seats on the
cabinet should be left vacant. He was helpless. He had to invite the
Congress to form the ministry. He wrote:
I dislike the idea of having an interim government dominated by one
party, but I feel I must try to get Congress in as soon as possible…
Secretary of State Cable approving my proposed approach to Nehru. I
don’t like it. (PP 324.329). |
