Chapter 10
The Price of the Mullah
SINCE use to Islam became central to British machinations, it is
important to take a close look at how they went about it. The
diaries of NWFP Governor Sir George Cunningham reveal the variety of
ways these heretics conspired to employ for their own selfish ends
pious. Muslim leaders and the devotees of the Prophet of Islam (May
peace be upon him).
The diaries are preserved in the India Office Library in London
among his personal papers. They are available to anyone for
verification or research. I obtained official copies of these on
requests.
I am conscious that the diaries mention names whose exposure will
cause deep hurt to their present descendants, but I consider it a
duty to the nation that it be told of the tactics adopted by the
colonial power to prolong its reign. The people should know this
lest any other power in future tries again to usurp their right by
using the sacred name of Islam.
When one reads the Cunningham diaries one is amazed how very
respectable, angelic persons, even some who had been trained in as
inspiring and ennobling an institution as Deoband, had allowed
themselves to be used for the cause of the British. With Quran in
hand and the Prophet’s teaching around their necks they went and
sold off their conscience and their faith in return for a few pieces
of silver.
Creating communal and religious splits among Indians and using these
for their own ends had been standard British practice. In NWFP,
however, they were faced with the problem that the Muslims here were
in such majority that they had no fear of non-Muslim ascendancy.
Besides, the Pushtoons had such confidence in themselves that they
could not conceive of ever becoming subservient to anyone. Those who
had defied as powerful and ruthless a nation as the British couldn’t
be intimidated by any one else.
The British therefore adopted a special tactic here – in the
province generally, in the tribal and Afghan areas in particular. It
consisted in winning over the mullahs and making them their local
support against the Russians. With the 1917 revolution in Russia the
Czarist military legacy had acquired an ideological force as well.
The later specially needed to be reckoned with. The British settled
on Islam as an appropriate counterpoise.
There was a good precedence. When the British had first encountered
real danger from Afghanistan in the form of Amir Ammnullah Khan they
had successfully used Islam. It was used at that time against
Muslims themselves and against the Pushtoon king of an Islamic
country. Later, when war clouds began gathering over Europe, they
again used Islam politically against threats to their power in
India. There seemed no reason why the formula could not be repeated
against an ideological conflict with the Russian.
As the situation began to get uncertain in NWFP, they found it
necessary to get to work. On the one side they were collecting the
Nawabs and Khawanin into the Muslim League fold to consolidate their
support. Now, on the other, they set about rallying the mullahs. Not
just within the province, but also in the tribal areas close by, and
even within Afghanistan, the Islamic front had begun to be given
shape and substance.
Cunningham relates that he assigned the task of liaising with
mullahs to Khan Bahadur Kuli Khan. This ensured that a link could be
established even with those clerics who were not yet ready to come
out into the open in support of the alien rulers. The first of the
hands that Kuli Khan recruited was Mullah Marwat, formally of the
Khaksar movement. The sales pitch was that the British had no
interest of their own; they were only concerned about protecting
against its enemies, against the Bolsheviks,; it was now necessary
that all those who had the cause of Islam close to their heart
should declare jihad against the ‘enemies’. Writes Cunningham:
Kuli Khan at once arranged secret meetings with tribal mullahs and
others who would not come out into the open. With some mullahs he
had to establish relations through certain persons in Hyderabad
state…Through Mullah Marwat, Kuli Khan established relations with
the office bearers of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Sarhad and their
supporters in India. These mullahs, many of whom had constantly been
anti-British, began to speak and wail against the Russians and
Germans on the platform and in the press. Subsidies were paid to all
these mullahs through Mullah Marwat.
The recruits were briefed to tell the Muslims that on one side were
the British, recognised by Islam as the People of the Book, and with
whom Islam even permitted intermarriage; on the other were the
Bolsheviks who were not only among the people of the Book but,
according to the British line of propaganda, were rank atheists. It
followed that the British and Islam were on the same side; the
common task was to fight against this new anti-religious threat. The
mullah’s were also required to keep emphasising to the Muslims that
enlisting in the British army and fighting in support of the British
was a great and noble service to Islam.
Cunningham writes that he had persuaded the leaders of
Jamiat-ul-Ulema Sarhad to go to Faqir Ipi in Waziristan and tell him
that his opposing Britain was no longer in the interest of Islam;
now Britain was at war with Germany and Italy, and had taken up arms
against kufr, which itself was a wholly Islamic objective.
This campaign of rallying Islam to Britain’s support through
letters, speeches, personal lobbying, etc., was being carried out
with extraordinary secrecy so that nobody got a hint that Britain
itself was involved in it. Cunningham, however, remained in constant
touch. He was told of every bit of progress. When Faqir Ipi’s aide,
Mohammad Waris, wrote back to Jamiat-ul-Ulema Sarhad, he quickly
learnt about it and was pleased. He noted the friendly tone and the
lack of any sign of suspicion that the effort had been undertaken at
British behest.
The outbreak of war in Europe led to differences within India
between the British and the Congress. Congress ministries resigned
in eight provinces and situation of confrontation began to develop.
The NWFP governor found it necessary that in addition to tribal
areas and Afghanistan, mullahs’ support in the province too should
be organised. Since in the early years the war was only against
Germany and Italy, the British thought it advisable to tone down
their campaign here against the Soviet Union and to concentrate more
on the two immediate enemies.
Cunningham had divided mullahs in three categories. The smaller ones
he had left to the care of local Khawanin and trusted Khan Bahadurs.
The middle rung group was made the responsibility of the deputy
commissioners, while the top category the governor took in his own
hands.
To begin at the lowest level, the governor writes that these were
being tackled by Khan Bahadur Ghulam Haider Khan of the Sherpao
village in Hashtnagar. He writes:
I have not been in touch with any of the smaller mullahs myself. I
have done it through the following agents with whom practically all
my communication has been verbally as little is put on paper as
possible…..Ghulam Haider of Sherpao….told me that he thought he
could work through bout nine or ten mullash, including those of the
following villages: Razzar, Kot, Tarnab, Tangi, Utmanzai and
Umarzai…..later Prang and Charsadda.
The governor asked Sherpao Khan to approach each of these mullahs
himself separately and prepare them for the service of Islam. He
should also give each mullah 40 to 50 rupees and ask the latter to
come again after four months to report what they had been doing. The
Khan Bahadur was also asked to drop a hint that if the performance
was satisfactory the allowance could be raised. The Khan Bahadur
suggested (Cunningham notes in his diary) that some of these mullahs
were not very reliable so why should he not call them over every
month and also pay them on a monthly basis, that is around ten
rupees each time. Cunningham writes that he gave Sherpao Khan a
lumpsum of Rs. 600.
Similarly, the list of mullahs of Nowshera and Peshawar tehsils was
made over to the deputy commissioner of the district, Sikandar
Mirza.
The clerics of Swat, Bunair, Mardan and Ranizai were at the time in
the care of the Prime Minister of Swat, Hazrat Ali. Writes
Cunningham:
The Wazir-e-Azam sent me a list of mullahs through whom he is
working; he is paying them on an average Rs. 15 per month each.
Wasn’t this a bit unfair to the mullahs of Hashtnagar and Doaba that
they got only Rs. 10 apiece while the other was paid Rs. 15.
The mullahs of Kohat had been entrusted to the deputy commissioner
of the district.
Those of Bannu were assigned by the D.C. of Bannu to two persons –
Nawab Zafar Khan and Taj Ali (the latter the son of Khan Bahadur
Ghulam Haider Khan).
The D.C. of D.I. Khan Mohammad Aslam received Rs. 600 from
Cunningham with the brief that Rs. 200 each should be given to
Amakhel Faqir, Pir Musa Kharti and Pir Zakori. These mullahs too
were told that if their performance proved satisfied, then their
amounts could be raised.
About Syed Abdul Jabbar Shah of Satanay, Cunningham reports that his
links were with the Prime Minister of Hyderabad Daccan, Sir Akbar
Hydari, from whom he received a regular allowance. Cunningham was
pleased that Syed would do the work for the British but would get
paid by Hyderabad.
Later, Abdul Jabbar Shah reported to the governor that he had made
arrangements for Swabi also. And for Bajaur too, where he had sent
his cousin (Tarbur).
Maulvi Barkatullah, the mujahideen leader of Asmos, had been
directly in touch with Cunningham for a long time. Cunningham notes:
My arrangement until now with him has been that he comes to see me
once or twice a year ….. Barkatullah said that he could also do a
good deal through perhaps 10 or 12 maulvis in different places
throughout Bajaur and Mohmand community…. I paid him Rs. 1,000.
Cunningham then gives a detailed description of the performance of
these mercenary mullahs, especially of Kuli Khan. It seems the Khan
Bahadur had most of his work performed through Jamiat-ul-Ulema
Sarhad.
The detail go into number of meetings held, resolutions passed,
pamphlets printed, tours undertaken and contacts established.
Cunningham also for the first time mentions the speeches made
against the Congress: “Maulana Mohammad Shuaib toured Mardan
district condemning Satyagraha….Pamphlet by Maulana Madaullah on war
situation, anti-Congress” …etc.
Having distributed money all round Cunningham now started wondering
if the province-wide network of mullahs receiving the British
largesse were also delivering the goods. He then sent out a team of
trusted men to go and see whether the mullahs were preaching support
for the British in their sermons in the mosques. He writes that the
intelligence he received pleased him immensely. Animated by deep
fervour these servants of Islam were ardently selling the nation at
Rs. 15 per month.
Cunningham was also happy the activities of the Swat Prime Minister,
Hazrat Ali (“Hazrat Ali…..is doing excellently in Swat and Bunair.
He uses Pir Ziarat, and also Ghulam Haider Sherpao in his
area….Hazrat Ali now covers the whole of Swat, Bunair and Mardan
Border”).
Amakhel Faqir of D.I Khan and the Pir of Musaze were also doing
well. The latter had personally come to see the governor in
Peshawar. The governor reports that the Pir co-coordinated with
Sheer Ali and had also probably recruited the Pir of Tajori. Sheer
Ali had even won over the Pir of Taunsa but, laments Cunningham,
this Pir had got involved in some cases of moral offence.
It appears that the Faqir of Ipi was still giving Cunningham a bad
time. He notes that word was sent through the faqirs of Thira and
Amatile, the mullah of Karbaugh and Haji Akhunzada to the Faqir of
IPI urging him to leave the British alone.
In Khyber, the political agent had handed over the responsibility of
enlisting clerics to Mullah Abdul Baqi. He reported of him that he
was a very useful, very reliable person and that he, the agent, had
given him Rs. 1,000. |
